Switch to: Citations

References in:

Imagining Reasons

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):181-192 (2011)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77-96.
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • The elements of moral philosophy.James Rachels & Stuart Rachels - 2015 - [Dubuque]: McGraw-Hill Education. Edited by James Rachels.
    Moral philosophy is the study of what morality is and what it requires of us. As Socrates said, it's about "how we ought to live"-and why. It would be helpful if we could begin with a simple, uncontroversial definition of what morality is. Unfortunately, we cannot. There are many rival theories, each expounding a different conception of what it means to live morally, and any definition that goes beyond Socrates's simple formula-tion is bound to offend at least one of them. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   219 citations  
  • Reasons, emotion, and moral judgment in the psychopath.Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Affect, Culture, and Morality, Or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller & Maria G. Dias - 1993 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (4):613-28.
    Are disgusting or disrespectful actions judged to be moral violations, even when they are harmless? Stories about victimless yet offensive actions (such as cleaning one's toilet with a flag) were presented to Brazilian and U.S. adults and children of high and low socioeconomic status (N = 360). Results show that college students at elite universities judged these stories to be matters of social convention or of personal preference. Most other Ss, especially in Brazil, took a moralizing stance toward these actions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   238 citations  
  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1543 citations  
  • Transgressors, victims, and cry babies: Is basic moral judgment spared in autism?Alan M. Leslie & Ron Mallon - 2006 - Social Neuroscience 1:270283.
    Human social intelligence comprises a wide range of complex cognitive and affective processes that appear to be selectively impaired in autistic spectrum disorders. The study of these neuro- developmental disorders and the study of canonical social intelligence have advanced rapidly over the last twenty years by investigating the two together. Specifically, studies of autism have provided important insights into the nature of ‘theory of mind’ abilities, their normal development and underlying neural systems. At the same time, the idea of impaired (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Autism, empathy and moral agency.Jeanette Kennett - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
    Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is empathy characterized in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  • Living With One's Choices Moral Reasoning In Vitro and In Vivo.Jeanette Kennett - 2012 - In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. pp. 257.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations