Physicians and patients rely on medical journals as trusted sources of medical information. Unfortunately, in multiple instances conflicts of interest have undermined the credibility of the medical literature.The primary sources of conflict of interest at medical journals are authors, reviewers, editors, and journals. Consider these examples.

Conflicts of interest have been reduced to financial conflicts. The National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) new rules for managing conflicts of interest in medical research, the first major change to the regulations in over 15 years, address only financial ties. Although several commentators urged that the regulations also cover non-financial interests, the Department of Health and Human Services declined to do so. Similarly, the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) influential 2009 Conflict of Interest Report focuses almost exclusively on financial conflicts. Institutional (...) policies at academic medical centers and guidance from professional bodies and medical journals also primarily emphasize financial ties. Even broadly worded rules are applied more readily to financial ties than non-financial interests, such as the regulations that restrict institutional review board (IRB) members with conflicting interests from participating in protocol reviews. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest have been reduced to financial conflicts. The National Institutes of Health’s new rules for managing conflicts of interest in medical research, the first major change to the regulations in over 15 years, address only financial ties. Although several commentators urged that the regulations also cover non-financial interests, the Department of Health and Human Services declined to do so. Similarly, the Institute of Medicine’s influential 2009 Conflict of Interest Report focuses almost exclusively on financial conflicts. Institutional policies at (...) academic medical centers and guidance from professional bodies and medical journals also primarily emphasize financial ties. Even broadly worded rules are applied more readily to financial ties than non-financial interests, such as the regulations that restrict institutional review board members with conflicting interests from participating in protocol reviews. (shrink)

The ubiquitous nature of medical conflicts of interest is attracting increased attention from physicians, policymakers, and patients. However, little work has examined the psychological processes at play in the presence of such conflicts. I investigate the subtle influences arising from conflicts of interest that change behavior in both physicians and patients. First, I explore why physicians accept gifts from pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers that appear, to many critics, to be unethical. I review evidence from my published and ongoing (...) research that demonstrates two psychological processes that enable physicians to accept industry gifts: a sense of entitlement and a sense of invulnerability to the biasing effects of conflicts of interest. Second, I investigate the situations that may increase or decrease bias. I find that people, subject to a financial conflict of interest, show greater bias in their advice when they feel less able to identify with the advice-recipient. This, perversely, leads to advisors giving more biased advice to groups of people than to one identified individual. Finally, I examine the impact of the conflicted advice on the patient and the success of policies intended to manage such conflicts. Mandatory second opinions and disclosure are often advocated as potential solutions to deal with conflicts of interest. However, both policies have limitations and can sometimes make matters worse. A primary advisor who knows about a second advisor may give even more biased advice since the presence of a second advisor undermines the relationship with the primary advisor. Also, although disclosure of a conflict of interest does have the intended effect of causing patients to trust the advice they receive less, I find that it also has an additional unintended consequence: it creates increased pressure to comply with the advice. This increased pressure occurs because patients want to avoid appearing as though they believe that the conflict of interest has corrupted their doctors' advice. Thus, instead of being merely a warning, disclosure can become a burdensome request to comply with advice the patient trusts less. These results highlight potential pitfalls that new policies intended to address conflicts of interest should seek to avoid. (shrink)

The medical profession is under a state of increasing scrutiny. Recent high profile scandals regarding substantial industry payments to physicians, surgeons, and medical researchers have raised serious concerns over conflicts of interest. Amidst this background, the public, physicians, and policymakers alike appear to make the same assumption regarding conflicts of interest; that doctors who succumb to influences from industry are making a deliberate choice of self-interest over professionalism and that these doctors are corrupt. In reality, a myriad of evidence from (...) social science indicates that influence from conflicts of interest often occurs on a subconscious and unintentional level. This poses an important issue, since such conflicts can steer wellintentioned physicians away from their primary professional goal to provide the best medical advice and treatment possible. (shrink)

Why do physicians have financial conflicts of interest? They arise because society expects physicians to act in their patients’ interest, while simultaneously, financial incentives encourage physicians to practice medicine in ways that promote their own interests or those of third parties. Because physicians’ clinical choices, referrals, and prescriptions affect the fortune of third parties (providers, medical facilities, insurers, drug firms and suppliers of ancillary services), these third parties may offer physicians financial incentives to make income-driven clinical choices. In the past, (...) physicians and scholars typically conceived of conflicts of interest as an ethical issue to be resolved according to individual judgment or professional and organizational norms. However, society can mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interest by changing financial and organizational arrangements in medicine. Conflicts of interest, therefore, are as much matters of public policy and management as individual choices or social norms. (shrink)

Why do physicians have financial conflicts of interest? They arise because society expects physicians to act in their patients’ interest, while simultaneously, financial incentives encourage physicians to practice medicine in ways that promote their own interests or those of third parties. Because physicians’ clinical choices, referrals, and prescriptions affect the fortune of third parties, these third parties may offer physicians financial incentives to make income-driven clinical choices. In the past, physicians and scholars typically conceived of conflicts of interest as an (...) ethical issue to be resolved according to individual judgment or professional and organizational norms. However, society can mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interest by changing financial and organizational arrangements in medicine. Conflicts of interest, therefore, are as much matters of public policy and management as individual choices or social norms. (shrink)

This paper explores the empirical evidence regarding the impact financial relationships on the behavior of health care providers, specifically, physicians. We identify and synthesize peer-reviewed data addressing whether financial incentives are causally related to patient outcomes and health care costs. We cover three main areas where financial conflicts of interest arise and may have an observable relationship to health care practices: physicians' roles as self-referrers, insurance reimbursement schemes that create incentives for certain clinical choices over others, and financial relationships between (...) physicians and the drug and device industries. We found a well-developed scientific literature consisting of dozens of empirical studies, some that allow stronger causal inferences than others, but which altogether show that such financial conflicts of interests can, and sometimes do, impact physicians' clinical decisions. Further research is warranted to document the causal relationship of such changes on health outcomes and the cost of care, but the current base of evidence is sufficiently robust to motivate policy reform. (shrink)

Physicians, scholars, and policymakers continue to be concerned about conflicts of interests among health care providers. At least two main types of objections to conflicts of interest exist. Conflicts of interests may be intrinsically troublesome if they violate providers’ fiduciary duties to their patients or they contribute to loss of trust in health care professionals and the health care system. Conflicts of interest may also be problematic in practice if they bias the decisions made by providers, adversely impacting patient outcomes (...) or wastefully increasing health care costs. This latter objection may be observed in differences in the prescriptions written, procedures performed, or costs billed by health care professionals who have conflicting interests, when compared to those that do not have such financial relationships. (shrink)

Financial relationships between physicians and industry are widespread. Highly publicized financial relationships between physicians and industry raised disturbing questions about the trustworthiness of clinical research, practice guidelines, and clinical care decisions. Recent incidents spurred calls for stricter conflict of interest policies and led to new federal laws and NIH regulations. These stricter policies have evoked praise, concerns, and objections. Because these new federal requirements need to be interpreted and implemented, spirited discussions of conflicts of interest in medicine will continue.

Financial relationships between physicians and industry are widespread. Highly publicized financial relationships between physicians and industry raised disturbing questions about the trustworthiness of clinical research, practice guidelines, and clinical care decisions. Recent incidents spurred calls for stricter conflict of interest policies and led to new federal laws and NIH regulations. These stricter policies have evoked praise, concerns, and objections. Because these new federal requirements need to be interpreted and implemented, spirited discussions of conflicts of interest in medicine will continue.

The increased focus in recent years on the risks posed by conflicts of interest arising from financial relationships between physician-investigators and the pharmaceutical and medical device industries has led to a variety of measures that can broadly be described as “regulatory” interventions, including new federal and state laws, criminal prosecutions and private lawsuits, requirements attached to government funding, and institutional policies. Studies suggest, however, that physician-investigators have not internalized the message that financial conflicts of interest have the potential to influence (...) their decision making. Simply informing physician-investigators of the content of relevant rules and the consequences of noncompliance — as appears to be the practice in many existing compliance training activities — is unlikely to lead to lasting changes in norms or behavior. Instead, we theorize that, for trainings to be maximally effective, they must appeal to the complex intrinsic and extrinsic motivations that contribute to individuals' willingness to comply with regulatory mandates. In addition, physician-investigators' beliefs that the risks posed by conflicts of interest do not apply to them need to be challenged. Rigorous evaluation of the newly-designed training programs will help determine whether these theories are borne out in fact. (shrink)

In recent years, the government, advocacy organizations, the press, and the public have pressured universities, academic medical centers, and physicianinvestigators to do more to ensure that their financial interests and relationships do not conflict with their duties to conduct high-quality research and protect the safety and welfare of clinical trial participants. A number of factors underlie the increased focus. First, private sector funding of clinical research has grown both in absolute terms and as a proportion of overall funding. In 2008, (...) the pharmaceutical, medical device, and biotechnology industries’ domestic research and development expenditures constituted approximately 60.9% of funding for biomedical research in the United States; the next largest funder, the National Institutes of Health, funded 27.9%. Private industry spent $58.6 billion on research in 2007, up from $40 billion in 2003, an increase of 25% after adjusting for inflation. (shrink)