Moral saints are the most worthy people who are regarded as examples and exemplifications in moral and religious cultures, for they are of special noetic-educational characteristics and extra actions beyond the bound of obligation. The two obligatory and value aspects of morality in the theories of normative ethics as well as the distinct approaches in religious and secular ethics have produced different explications of the actions beyond the limits of moral duty and sanctimonious features. Moreover, various pictures of the saints' (...) nature presented in western writers' works have resulted in the reduction of the status of saints to the rank of a politician lacking in holiness. While most theoreticians confirm the holiness of the saints, yet there are some hesitations. Describing the nature of saints in secular and religious ethics on the basis of different approaches, the present essay makes inquiries about the application of "saint" in different cultures and looks to opposite views on the moral status of the saints as well as critical responses to them. (shrink)

BEGINNING with G. E. M. Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, various critics--e.g., Frankena, Foot, MacIntyre, and Murdock--have, to one extent or another, expressed dissatisfaction with the condition of modern moral philosophy. Prior to this round of critiques, H. A. Prichard in 1912 asked the question "Is Moral Philosophy Based on a Mistake?" in an essay of that title in Mind. One finds precedent for these expressions of discontent with the ground rules of moral philosophy in both Aristotle and Kant, (...) two thinkers whose reformulations of the questions and procedures of ethics proved seminal for the discipline. Even neglecting other important developments in contemporary moral philosophy, the diversity and rigour of these critiques alone suggest that the prognosis for the discipline of ethics is quite favorable. Philosophy in at least one of its dimensions has recovered that self-reflective attentiveness that marks its most productive phases. So it is that several of these contemporary critiques raise the suspicion that what is wrong with moral philosophy is that it operates outside of a context in terms of which talk about moral laws or moral goods would be intelligible. Our contemporary situation can thus be contrasted with, for example, that of Aristotle for whom a discussion of "magnificence" was firmly rooted in an Athenian context in terms of which an argument over the merits of that particular virtue might be resolved. Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue brings this line of reflection into sharp new focus with a series of illuminating discussions concerning the role of the virtues both in the history of moral practices and in the logic of moral argument. In general, MacIntyre tries to show that "contemporary moral debate is interminable" ; that is, he tries to show why, given the nature of contemporary moral philosophy, there is "no rational way of securing moral agreement". Because I believe MacIntyre is successful in his demonstration, I shall, in this paper, take that demonstration for granted and try to construct a set of arguments designed to show how, in terms of a universally accessible paradigmatic character, we have at hand a way of avoiding the "interminable" regress of moral debate. Thus although my argument is derivative to MacIntyre's diagnosis and dependent, in part, upon his treatment of the concept of virtue, the proposal I develop here for the resolution of moral arguments is, sadly to say, somewhat at odds with his own. (shrink)

In 1941 Father Maximilian Kolbe, a Polish friar from Warsaw was arrested for publishing anti-Nazi pamphlets and sentenced to Auschwitz. There he was beaten, kicked by shiny leather boots, and whipped by his prison guards. After one prisoner successfully escaped, the prescribed punishment was to select ten other prisoners who were to die by starvation. As ten prisoners were pulled out of line one by one, Fr. Kolbe broke out from the ranks, pleading with he Commandant to be allowed to (...) take the place of one of the prisoners, a Polish worker with a wife and children dependent upon him. "I'm an old man, sir, and good for nothing. My life will serve no purpose," the 45 year old priest pleaded. He was taken, thrown down the stairs into a dank dark basement with the other nine prisoners and left to starve. Usually, prisoners punished like this spent their last days howling, attacking each other and clawing the walls in a frenzy of despair. (shrink)