Preface This book is about semantics and logic. More specifically, it is about the semantics and logic of natural language; and, even more specifically than ...

Event semantics takes eventualities, understood as events, processes, and states, to be basic objects in reality, not set-theoretic constructions from something else . I defend this view and argue that events, processes, and states form pairwise disjoint sorts, having the ontological status of atoms, aggregates, and mass objects, respectively. Aggregates are composed of atoms, whereas mass objects are not. Two intermediate groupings of eventualities are important in this mereological characterization: occurrences, comprising events and processes, and eventuality chunks, comprising processes and (...) states. Processes are the sort of eventualities belonging to both categories. ;Focusing on the ontology of occurrences, I argue that processes constitute events, although events are not identical to the processes that constitute them. Events and the processes that constitute them are spatio-temporally superposed, meaning that they have the same spatio-temporal parts; but spatio-temporal superposition is not tantamount to identity, because events and the processes that constitute them are modally distinct. Constitution cannot be characterized in extensional terms, for it appeals to an asymmetry in persistence conditions between the constituent parts and what they constitute . I argue that if a process constitutes an event, then there are worlds in which the process exists but the event does not. In this sense, a process can survive the destruction of the event that it constitutes. ;Eventualities are ontologically dependent particulars: necessarily they exist only if their participants exist, and their identity depends on their participants. I claim that events differ from the processes that constitute them in that they are ontologically dependent upon consequent states as well. An event is necessarily such that it cannot exist unless its consequent state exists, and its identity depends on the identity of its consequent state; an event differs in this respect from the process constituting it, which is not ontologically dependent upon a consequent state. (shrink)

I might summarize this section by saying that the English tenses, according to this analysis, form quite a motley group. PAST, PRES and FUT serve to relate reference time to speech time, while WOULD and USED-TO behave like Priorian operators, shifting the point of evaluation away from the reference time. HAVE also shifts the point of evaluation away from the reference time, but in a more complicated way. And FUT, in contrast to PRES and PAST, is a substitution operator, putting (...) the reference time of its clause in the plate of the speech time of subordinate clauses. (shrink)

ignate remote or historical past, the perfect being furthermore restricted to events not witnessed by the speaker.3 In the intervening stage of Vedic Sanskrit, the past tenses show a complex mix of temporal, aspectual, and discourse functions. On top of that, Rigvedic retains the injunctive, a chameleon-like category of underspecified finite verbs whose many uses partly overlap with those of the past tenses. The present study of the Rigvedic system is offered as a preliminary step towards the reconstruction and theoretical (...) interpretation of this aspect-to-tense trajectory. (shrink)