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Innate Mind Need Not Be Within

Acta Analytica 36:101-121 (2021)

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  1. Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
    Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of controversy regarding what kinds of things concepts are, how they are structured, and how they are acquired. This chapter offers a detailed high-level overview and critical evaluation of the main theories of concepts and their motivations. Taking into account the various challenges that each theory faces, the chapter also presents a novel approach (...)
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  • Conceived This Way: Innateness Defended.Robert Northcott & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    We propose a novel account of the distinction between innate and acquired biological traits: biological traits are innate to the degree that they are caused by factors intrinsic to the organism at the time of its origin; they are acquired to the degree that they are caused by factors extrinsic to the organism. This account borrows from recent work on causation in order to make rigorous the notion of quantitative contributions to traits by different factors in development. We avoid the (...)
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  • Innateness and the situated mind.Robert D. Rupert - 2009 - In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 96--116.
    forthcoming in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge UP).
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  • Concepts and nativism.Nicholas Adamson - unknown
    Jerry Fodor has argued that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. I argue against this position, but not, as other have done, on the grounds that the arguments against lexical decomposition upon which Fodor relies are flawed. Rather, I argue that even if lexical concepts cannot be decomposed, the possession conditions for having lexical concepts are nonetheless not innately satisfied.
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  • Language and Reality, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language.Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny - 1988 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):377-378.
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  • Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.
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  • Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language.Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny - 1989 - Mind 98 (390):313-315.
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  • A theory of content II.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In A Theory of Content. MIT Press.
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