In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Contra Spinoza? Wim Klever In Book 1 ofthe TreatiseofHumanNature1 Spinoza enjoys thehonour ofbeing the only figure from the history of philosophy and science to be explicitly and extensively discussed by Hume. This honour is, however, a dubious one as the treatment he gets is not so friendly. The passage (T 232-51) is full of insults and denunciations: Spinoza is referred to as "that famous atheist" (T 241), and (...) characterized as "universally infamous" (T 240). His doctrine contains "a true atheism" (T 240). His theory about the thinking substance is an "hideous hypothesis" (T 241); Hume does not want to enter "farther into these gloomy and obscure regions" (T 241), although he spends ten pages on the subject. Richard Popkin2 suggests on account ofthis not too well studied section: "In introducing Spinoza into the discussion of the immateriality ofthe soul, Hume follows what was common practice in his day." This statement, if true, raises the question whether Hume was sincere in writing these 'satanicverses'. Does he, after all, hide the backside of his tongue? This would bring him pretty well in line with two of his English forerunners; with Hobbes about whom Aubrey recorded: "He toldme he [Spinoza]had outthrown him [Hobbes] a bar's length, for he [Hobbes] durst not write so boldly," and with Locke, who possessedinhis privatelibraryall Spinoza's worksbutnonetheless, for one reason or another, refused to assess the theories of "those decried names," saying "I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinoza as to be able to say what were their opinions in this matter" (namely the pre-existence ofthe soul).4 One commentator, named Gilbert Boss, wrote a two volume dissertation in order to argue for the fundamental opposition between the philosophical systems of both thinkers. In this paper I wish to propose another view and to defend their overall agreement. I will not do so with regard to their thought on religion (as this is already done byPopkin), but I shall more specificallyfocuson the theoretical (mainly epistemological) part oftheir work. Coming to Hume's text the reader of Spinoza's work who is, moreover, convinced by his geometrical demonstration of the propositions, does feel himself quite well at home chez Hume. Hume's is not another world for him. Apart from the question who is the real first modern thinker, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza or Hume, there is much common in their treatises on man and world, not only methodologically. Hume's rejection of "the antient philosophy," in Volume XVI Number 2 89 WIM KLEVER which he criticizes the "fictions... concerning substances, and substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities" (T 219), "sympathies, antipathies, and horrors ofa vacuum" (T 224) could have been written by the three other candidates as well. In fact every one of thoseitems maybe tracedoutin Spinoza's work; compare, for instance, JSp 136 ("doctrinam illam puerilem et nugatoriam de formis substantialibus, qualitatibus etc.") or 2 PPC 8s ("Quare omnia ilia figmenta de sympathie et antipathie ut falsa sunt reicienda... Nunquam dicendum erit, quod corpus aliquod movetur, ne detur vacuum; sed tantum ex alterius impulsu"). But let us go to the main theme in Book 1 ofthe Treatise, already present in Part 1, Section 1, "Ofthe Origin ofour Ideas." All our ideas result from impressions, themselves also being ideas or perceptions, though withmoreforce andliveliness. The original perceptions aresaid to be "the causes of our ideas" (T 5). We find the impressions in our mind and their effects, our ideas. Hume does not explain the cognitive status ofthe impressions by reducing them to non-cognitive processes. The "universe of the imagination" (T 68) is a world apart, irreducible to matter; we can't step out ofit, "since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind" (T 67). Ideas, whatever their character (about external existences or not), can only be explained by other ideas. Hume carefully avoids the category mistake of transcending the border from mental to material things and keeps consequently, at least methodologically, to the absolute caesura between mind and body. The Spinozistic reader must necessarily feel sympathy for this position. The attributes of... (shrink)