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  1. Would you believe it? The king of France is back! Presuppositions and truth-value intuitions.Kai Von Fintel - 2004 - In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and beyond. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.Robert Stalnaker - 1981 - In William Leonard Harper, Robert Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 87-104.
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  • (1 other version)A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
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  • Ifs.William Leonard Harper, Robert Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.) - 1981 - Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
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  • Identifying reference and truth-values.P. F. Strawson - 1964 - Theoria 30 (2):96-118.
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  • Defending Conditional Excluded Middle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):650-668.
    Lewis (1973) gave a short argument against conditional excluded middle, based on his treatment of ‘might’ counterfactuals. Bennett (2003), with much of the recent literature, gives an alternative take on ‘might’ counterfactuals. But Bennett claims the might-argument against CEM still goes through. This turns on a specific claim I call Bennett’s Hypothesis. I argue that independently of issues to do with the proper analysis of might-counterfactuals, Bennett’s Hypothesis is inconsistent with CEM. But Bennett’s Hypothesis is independently objectionable, so we should (...)
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  • Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
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  • Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
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  • (3 other versions)On referring.Peter F. Strawson - 1950 - Mind 59 (235):320-344.
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  • Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
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  • (2 other versions)Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.
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  • (1 other version)Ifs.Jonathan Dancy - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):96-98.
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  • Epistemic Containment.Kai von Fintel & Sabine Iatridou - 2003 - Linguistic Inquiry 34:173-98.
    This article concerns a new constraint on the interaction of quantifier phrases and epistemic modals. It is argued that QPs cannot bind their traces across an epistemic modal, though it is shown that scoping mechanisms of a differentnature are permitted to cross epistemic modals. The nature and source of this constraint are investigated.
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  • If and when if -clauses can restrict quantifiers.Kai von Fintel - manuscript
    The interpretation of if -clauses in the scope of ordinary quantifiers has provoked semanticists into extraordinary measures, such as abandoning compositionality or claiming that if has no meaning. We argue that if -clauses have a normal conditional meaning, even in the scope of ordinary quantifiers, and that the trick is to have the right semantics for conditionals.
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  • Conditional necessity and possibility.Angelika Kratzer - 1979 - In Rainer Bäuerle, Urs Egli & Arnim von Stechow (eds.), Semantics from different points of view. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 117--147.
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  • Conditionals and compositionality.James Higginbotham - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):181–194.
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  • Quantifiers and 'if'-clauses.Kai von Finkel - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):209-214.
    which he calls general indicatives, are correctly analysed as open indicative conditionals prefixed by universal quantifiers. So they are both analysed as (∀x)(if x gets a chance, x bungee-jumps), where x ranges over girls. This analysis is attributed to Geach.2 Barker then shows that this syntactic analysis, together with other premises, entails that the open conditional occurring under the universal quantifier has to be analysed as having the import of material implication.
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  • A reply to mr. Sellars.P. F. Strawson - 1954 - Philosophical Review 63 (2):216-231.
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  • Linguistic theory and Davidson's program in semantics.James Higginbotham - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 29--48.
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