Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Blaming Badly.Mark Alicke - 2008 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (1-2):179-186.
    Moral philosophers, legal theorists, and psychologists who study moral judgment are remarkably agreed in prescribing how to blame people. A blameworthy act occurs when an actor intentionally, negligently or recklessly causes foreseen, or foreseeable, harmful consequences without any compelling mitigating or extenuating circumstances. This simple formulation conveniently forestalls intricacies about how to construe concepts such as will, causation, foresight, and mitigation, but putting that aside for the moment, it seems fair to say that blame “professionals” share compatible conceptions of how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • The View From Building 20: Essays in Linguistics in Honor of Sylvain Bromberger.Kenneth Locke Hale & Samuel Jay Keyser (eds.) - 1993 - MIT Press.
    These seven original essays commissioned in tribute to MIT Philosophy Professor Sylvain Bromberger present some of the most exciting research being conducted ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   201 citations  
  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Practical Reality is a lucid original study of the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. Jonathan Dancy maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   391 citations  
  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   883 citations  
  • Self and other in the explanation of behavior: 30 years later.Joshua Knobe & Bertram Malle - 2002 - Psychologica Belgica 42:113-130.
    It has been hypothesized that actors tend to attribute behavior to the situation whereas observers tend to attribute behavior to the person (Jones & Nisbett 1972). The authors argue that this simple hypothesis fails to capture the complexity of actual actor-observer differences in people’s behavioral explanations. A new framework is proposed in which reason explanations are distinguished from explanations that cite causes, especially stable traits. With this framework in place, it becomes possible to show that there are a number of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A Theory of Human Action.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1970 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   483 citations  
  • Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited.Shaun Nichols & Joseph Ulatowski - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):346–365.
    Recent work by Joshua Knobe indicates that people’s intuition about whether an action was intentional depends on whether the outcome is good or bad. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this effect is that there are stable individual differences in how ‘intentional’ is interpreted. That is, in Knobe’s cases, different people interpret the term in different ways. This interpretive diversity of ‘intentional’ opens up a new avenue to help explain Knobe’s results. Furthermore, the paper argues that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   133 citations  
  • (1 other version)Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions: Some problems for juror impartiality.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):203 – 219.
    In this paper, I first review some of the recent empirical work on the biasing effect that moral considerations have on folk ascriptions of intentional action. Then, I use Mark Alicke's affective model of blame attribution to explain this biasing effect. Finally, I discuss the relevance of this research - both philosophical and psychological - to the problem of the partiality of jury deliberation. After all, if the immorality of an action does affect folk ascriptions of intentionality, and all serious (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Folk intuitions, asymmetry, and intentional side effects.Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):214-219.
    An agent S wants to A and knows that if she A-s she will also bring about B. S does not care at all about B. S then A-s, also bringing about B. Did she intentionally bring B about? Joshua Knobe (2003b) has recently argued that, according to the folk concept of intentional action, the answer depends on B's moral significance. In particular, if B is reprehensible, people are more likely to say that S intentionally brought it about. Knobe defends (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • (1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1054 citations  
  • (1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
    What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1300 citations  
  • On Trying to Save the Simple View.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
    According to the analysis of intentional action that Michael Bratman has dubbed the ‘Simple View’, intending toxis necessary for intentionallyx‐ing. Despite the plausibility of this view, there is gathering empirical evidence that when people are presented with cases involving moral considerations, they are much more likely to judge that the action (or side effect) in question was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that the agent intended to do it. This suggests that at least as far as the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.J. Knobe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):190-194.
    There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   464 citations  
  • Intention, intentional action and moral considerations.J. Knobe - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):181-187.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?Fred Adams & Annie Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173-181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • Acting for Reasons and Acting Intentionally.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):355-374.
    The thesis may be expressed as: An agent intentionally A's if and only if she A's for a reason. My aim in this paper is to show that the spirit of the thesis, if not its letter, survives a variety of criticisms and to illuminate, in the process, the nature of reasons for action, acting for reasons, and acting intentionally.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Asymmetries in judgments of responsibility and intentional action.Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):24-50.
    Abstract: Recent experimental research on the 'Knobe effect' suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Reasons and purposes: human rationality and the teleological explanation of action.G. F. Schueler - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Intention, temporal order, and moral judgments.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ron Mallon, Tom Mccoy & Jay G. Hull - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (1):90–106.
    The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the temporal order of good and bad effects affects whether acts are classified as killings. This finding suggests that the moral judgments are not based on the classifications. Our results also undermine recent claims that prior moral judgments determine whether agents are seen as causing effects intentionally rather (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • (1 other version)The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
    It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a tool (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   173 citations  
  • Doing Things for Reasons.Bittner Rüdiger - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):495-497.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • A Theory of Human Action. [REVIEW]Myles Brand - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (9):249-257.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   166 citations  
  • Can one act for a reason without acting intentionally?Joshua Knobe & Sean D. Kelly - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 169--183.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Doing things for reasons.Rüdiger Bittner - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What exactly are the reasons we do things, and how are they related to the resulting actions? Bittner explores this question and proposes an answer: a reason is a response to that state of affairs. Elegantly written, this work is a substantial contribution to the fields of rationality, ethics, and action theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The folk strike back; or, why you didn’t do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it.Mark T. Phelan & Hagop Sarkissian - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):291 - 298.
    Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • Intentional action and moral considerations: still pragmatic.F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):268-276.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • (1 other version)Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   420 citations  
  • College students implicitly judge interracial sex and gay sex to be morally wrong.Joshua Knobe, Paul Bloom & David Pizarro - manuscript
    College students implicitly judge interracial sex and gay sex to be morally wrong Some moral intuitions arise from psychological processes that are not fully accessible to consciousness. For instance, most people disapprove of consensual adult incest between siblings, but are unable to articulate why—they just feel that it is wrong (Haidt, 2001). More generally, there is evidence for at least two sources of moral judgment: explicit conscious reasoning and tacit intuitions, which are motivated by emotional responses (Greene et al., 2001) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations