Alfredo Traps in Durrenmatt’s tale discovers that he has brought off, all by himself, a murder involving considerable ingenuity. The mock prosecutor in the tale demands the death penalty “as reward for a crime that merits admiration, astonishment, and respect.” Traps is deeply moved; indeed, he is exhilarated, and the whole of his life becomes more heroic, and, ironically, more precious. His defense attorney proceeds to argue that Traps was not only innocent but incapable of guilt, “a victim of the (...) age.” This defense Traps disavows with indignation and anger. He makes claim to the murder as his and demands the prescribed punishment—death. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reading the Philosophy of Right The Terms of Ethical Life The Hard Work of Freedom Conclusion Notes References.

At the end of the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel outlines a retributivist theory of criminal punishment. According to this view, crime is an infringement of right, a negation which itself must be negated in order to establish the actuality of right. Crime is superseded through punishment, which inflicts on the criminal an injury that is equal in magnitude or “value” to the injury inflicted by the crime itself. Nothing in this account appears to foreclose the possibility (...) that an appropriate penalty for some crimes may be death. Indeed, some passages in the Philosophy of Right strongly imply an acceptance of the legitimacy of capital punishment for certain crimes, such as murder. (shrink)

Dans le rapport qui s’établit, chez Hegel, entre le crime et la peine, c’est toute la validité du procès dialectique (et de son immanence) qui se joue en tant qu’il ne doit laisser place à aucune irrationalité. Penser la rationalité de la peine signifie, dans ce cadre, penser la continuité entre la volonté qui commet le crime et celle qui, en voulant la sanction, rejoint l’universel. C’est donc bien du point de vue du criminel qu’il faut se placer pour avoir (...) une chance de saisir la vérité du droit pénal. Le crime, en même temps qu’il s’inscrit dans un ordre déjà régi par le droit, manifeste la finitude du droit abstrait, c’est-à-dire son incapacité à fournir un modèle de reconnaissance adéquat aux exigences de l’esprit. Dès lors, le passage à la « moralité»s’impose qui prend en charge la subjectivité agissante dans toute sa complexité et au cours d’un processus où le bien ne lui apparaît plus comme une contrainte. Mais ce passage n’est pas sans ambiguïté : Hegel nous met aussi en garde contre toute moralisation prématurée de la peine (sous la forme de la « vengeance ») : le droit pénal n’accède véritablement à l’effectivité qu’au terme de son institutionnalisation dans la « société civile ». (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Empty Formalism in the Philosophy of Right Kantian Reply Strategies Acknowledgments Notes Abbreviations References.

The purpose of this essay is to critically appraise J. Angelo Corlett's recent interpretation of Kant's theory of punishment as well as his rejection of Hegel's penology. In taking Kant to be a retributivist at a primary level and a proponent of deterrence at a secondary level, I believe Corlett has inappropriately wed together Kant's distinction between moral and positive law. Moreover, his support of Kant on these grounds is misguided as it is instead Hegel who holds such a distinction. (...) Finally, I attempt to refute the almost timeless retributivist rejection of deterrence-based theories of punishment on the grounds that the latter somehow would condone in some cases the punishment of innocent persons. These individuals almost always demand that no innocent person be punished as a rule of the highest order. (shrink)

This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and a (...) concern with the concept of desert. Each objection is deflected in order to ward-off what seem to be the most serious criticisms of a retributivist view of punishment and to clarify the depth of the retributivist position. (shrink)