Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)Pragmatism, Old and New.Susan Haack - 2004 - Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (1):3-41.
    The reformist philosophy of the classical pragmatist tradition has gradually evolved into the now-fashionable revolutionary styles of pragmatism, some scientistic, some literary. This evolution is traced from Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, through Schiller, Lewis, Hook,and Quine, to Rorty’s literary-political neo-pragmatism. Rather than get hung up on the question of which variants qualify as authentic pragmatism, it is better — more fruitful, and appropriately forward looking— to ask what we can learn from the older tradition, and what we can salvage (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • On classical and neo-analytic forms of pragmatism.Tom Rockmore - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):259-271.
    Pragmatism as it originally arose in America has always been pluralist, always willing to find space for those who understood it in other ways. But in the emergence of neo-analytic pragmatism it is possible that the term has been stretched beyond its limits in a way that does more harm than good in veiling if not actually obscuring central tenets that are well worth preserving. The aim of this article is to describe some aspects of this phenomenon and to draw (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • On Quine on Carnap on Ontology.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (1):93 - 122.
    W. V. Quine assumed that in _Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Rudolf Carnap was attempting to dodge commitment to abstract entities--without either renouncing quantification over them or demonstrating their dispensability--by wielding the analytic/synthetic distinction against ontological issues. Quine's interpretation of Carnap's intent--and his criticism of it--is widely endorsed. But Carnap objected, I argue, not to abstract entities, but to his critics' suggestion that empiricism implies nominalism. Quine's and Carnap's views are therefore more akin than Quine ever suspected. Unfortunately, Quine's misinterpretation of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • The dogma of logical pragmatism.David Rynin - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):379-391.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On Quine's rejection of intensional entities.Michael Jubien - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):209–225.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The three quines.John Fennell - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (3):261 – 292.
    This paper concerns Quine's stance on the issue of meaning normativity. I argue that three distinct and not obviously compatible positions on meaning normativity can be extracted from his philosophy of language - eliminative ]naturalism (Quine I), deflationary pragmatism (Quine II), and (restricted) strong normativism (Quine III) - which result from Quine's failure to separate adequately four different questions that surround the issue: the reality, source, sense, and scope of the normative dimension. In addition to the incompatibility of the views (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • W. V. Quine and the origins of analytic philosophy in the united states.Joel Isaac - 2005 - Modern Intellectual History 2 (2):205-234.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Ontological Relativity.Steven Andrew Kaufman - 1992 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (1):36-36.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations