Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.

Second, this collection of cognitive programs evolved in the Pleistocene to solve the adaptive problems regularly faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors-...

TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword xi Steven Pinker Acknowledgments xvii Contributors xix Introduction: The Emergence of Evolutionary Psychology xxiii David M. Buss PART I FOUNDATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY David M. Buss 1 Conceptual Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology 5 John Tooby and Leda Cosmides 2 Life History Theory and Evolutionary Psychology 68 Hillard S. Kaplan and Steven W. Gangestad 3 Domain Specificity and Intuitive Ontology 96 Pascal Boyer and H. Clark Barrett 4 Methods of Evolutionary Sciences 119 Jeffry A. Simpson and Lorne (...) Campbell 5 Controversial Issues in Evolutionary Psychology 145 Edward H. Hagen PART II SURVIVAL David M. Buss 6 Locating Places 177 Irwin Silverman and Jean Choi 7 Adaptations to Predators and Prey 200 H. Clark Barrett 8 Adaptations to Dangers from Humans 224 Joshua D. Duntley PART III MATING David M. Buss Adaptationism and Human Mating Psychology 255 Donald Symons 9 Fundamentals of Human Mating Strategies 258 David P. Schmitt 10 Physical Attractiveness in Adaptationist Perspective 292 Lawrence S. Sugiyama 11 Adaptations to Ovulation 344 Steven W. Gangestad, Randy Thornhill, and Christine E. Garver-Apgar 12 Female Infidelity and Sperm Competition 372 Todd K. Shackelford, Nicholas Pound, Aaron T. Goetz, and Craig W. LaMunyon 13 Sexual Coercion 394 Neil M. Malamuth, Mark Huppin, and Bryant Paul 14 Commitment, Love, and Mate Retention 419 Lorne Campbell and Bruce J. Ellis PART IV PARENTING AND KINSHIP Martin Daly and Margo Wilson 15 Cooperation and Conflict among Kin 447 Jeffrey A. Kurland and Steven J. C. Gaulin 16 Evolution of Paternal Investment 483 David C. Geary 17 Parental Investment and Parent-Offspring Conflict 506 Catherine Salmon 18 Altruism and Genetic Relatedness 528 Eugene Burnstein 19 Hormones and the Human Family 552 Mark V. Flinn, Carol V. Ward, and Robert J. Noone PART V GROUP LIVING David M. Buss 20 Neurocognitive Adaptations Designed for Social Exchange 584 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby 21 Aggression 628 Anne Campbell 22 Managing Ingroup and Outgroup Relationships 653 Robert Kurzban and Steven Neuberg 23 Dominance, Status, and Social Hierarchies 676 Denise Cummins 24 The Evolution of Language 698 Peter F. MacNeilage and Barbara L. Davis 25 The Evolution of Cognitive Bias 724 Martie G. Haselton, Daniel Nettle, and Paul W. Andrews 26 The Evolution of Morality 747 Dennis Krebs PART VI EVOLUTIONIZING TRADITIONAL DISCIPLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY David M. Buss 27 Evolutionary Cognitive Psychology 776 Peter M. Todd, Ralph Hertwig, and Ulrich Hoffrage 28 Evolutionary Social Psychology 803 Douglas T. Kenrick, Jon K. Maner, and Norman P. Li 29 Evolutionary Developmental Psychology 828 David F. Bjorklund and Carlos Hernández Blasi 30 Evolutionary Personality Psychology 851 Aurelio José Figueredo, Jon A. Sefcek, Geneva Vasquez, Barbara H. Brumbach, James E. King, and W. Jake Jacobs 31 Biological Function and Dysfunction 878 Jerome C. Wakefield 32 Evolutionary Psychology and Mental Health 903 Randolph M. Nesse PART VII APPLICATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY TO OTHER DISCIPLINES David M. Buss 33 Literature and Evolutionary Psychology 931 Joseph Carroll 34 Evolutionary Psychology and the Law 953 Owen D. Jones Afterword 975 Richard Dawkins Author Index 981 Subject Index 1009. (shrink)

The 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. (...) This unexpected victory proved that cooperation - one might even say altruism - is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations. (shrink)

This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity “strong reciprocity” and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who (...) behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity. (shrink)

Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on (...) the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is “no,” then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is “yes” and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation. (shrink)

As evidence that cultural group selection has occurred, Richerson et al. simply retrodict that humans use language, punish each other, and have religion. This is a meager empirical haul after 30 years. This contrasts sharply with the adaptationist approach to human behavior – evolutionary psychology – which has produced scores of novel, specific, and empirically confirmed predictions.