I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only that there be (...) Fs, but also that the term expressed by 'Fs' should not misrepresent them. In certain cases we might believe that there are Fs without believing our conception of Fs applies to them. This may well be the situation we are in with regard to abstract entities of various sorts. (shrink)

In this discussion note, I defend Gaunilo's famous parody of Anselm's Ontological Argument for God's existence against a well-known objection due to Alvin Plantinga.

Unlike the first English translation in 1974, this edition contains the text corresponding to Brentano's original 1874 edition.

This book discusses and exemplifies the philosophy of religion, or philosophical reflection on central themes of religion.