In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle offers a solution to the problem of motivating morality based on his distinction between three types of friendship. I consider Aristotle's argument in detail, placing it in a context of similar concerns about the question of why we ought to be moral that ranges from Socrates' discussion of the ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic to Wittgenstein's distinction between internal and external rewards and punishments for action in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Contrary to J.O. Urmson's conclusion that Aristotle's (...) discussion of the highest form of friendship is an editorial insertion in Book VIII of the Ethics, I attempt to show, by filling in the necessary steps in Aristotle's inference, that the treatment of friendship is an integral part of what Aristotle considers a complete moral philosophy. According to the interpretation that I propose, Aristotle's account of being worthy of the highest form of friendship is indispensable to his explanation of an internally rewarding reason for being moral. (shrink)

"The only reward of virtue is virtue; the only way to have a friend is to be one." -Ralph Waldo Emerson, Friendship Emerson's essay on Friendship (1841) is essentially a tribute to the ways friendship enhances human lives. In it, he stresses the happiness that two people who meet on common ground can experience. As friendships grow, both parties learn to appreciate and admire the assets and accomplishments of the other and experience joy by observing their successes, according to Emerson. (...) In the presence of a friend, "there is no winter and no night; all tragedies, all ennuis vanish.". (shrink)