Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Perspective.Doris Bischof-Köhler - 2012 - Emotion Revies 4 (1):40-48.
    Empathy means understanding another person’s emotional or intentional state by vicariously sharing this state. As opposed to emotional contagion, empathy is characterized by the self–other distinction of subjective experience. Empathy develops in the second year, as soon as symbolic representation and mental imagery set in that enable children to represent the self, to recognize their mirror image, and to identify with another person. In experiments with 126 children, mirror recognition and readiness to empathize with a distressed playmate were investigated. Almost (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • (1 other version)Empathy and Self-Recognition in Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Perspective.Doris Bischof-Köhler - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):40-48.
    Empathy means understanding another person’s emotional or intentional state by vicariously sharing this state. As opposed to emotional contagion, empathy is characterized by the self–other distinction of subjective experience. Empathy develops in the second year, as soon as symbolic representation and mental imagery set in that enable children to represent the self, to recognize their mirror image, and to identify with another person. In experiments with 126 children, mirror recognition and readiness to empathize with a distressed playmate were investigated. Almost (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Development of Empathy in Infants.Doris Bischof-Köhler - unknown
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.
    Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations