A logic of questions and answers exists within the logic of statements, if we make the following identifications (roughly): "Whether" questions are identified with true exclusive disjunctions, and "which" questions are identified with true existential quantifications. The question-and-answer process is interpreted as an information-matching game. The question mark is not needed except as a device of abbreviation. Complete and partial answers can be distinguished and various relations of relevance, independence, and resolution defined.

If the currently available theories of semantic information and utility-expectation are to be applied in a satisfactory way, they must be combined with a message-processing procedure. This paper presents a model of communication within which such a procedure can be defined. In this model the sender's messages arrive over a period of time, the receiver can reject some messages and retain others, the receiver can change his mind in various ways, and the receiver can apply various evaluation functions to a (...) "usable message total". As one example of message-evaluation, a system for evaluating news-value is presented. (shrink)

I am grateful to Professor Wheatley for his note, [3], on my analysis of interrogatives, [1]. His comments bring out very clearly a number of considerations that deserve our closest attention. For example, he shows that if we can classify interrogatives as true and false—as I proposed to do—then we can properly inquire about what sentences contradict them, and what sentences are contingently or logically equivalent to them. Furthermore, he shows that, on my analysis, no indirect question can contradict any (...) other indirect question and he accordingly, and correctly, looks for such contradictories among declarative sentences. Finally, he notes, [3], p. 54, that in my article, I have treated only inquisitive questions and have said nothing about deliberative or practical questions. While practical questions demand a different kind of treatment than that which Wheatley speculatively, albeit very tentatively, extrapolates for me, still these questions do form a kind of interrogative that did not get any attention in my article. (shrink)

Professor Leonard proposes that imperative and interrogative sentences be classified, together with declarative ones, as true and false. The interesting analysis he gives in connection with this proposal points out that these three types of utterance have something in common and has the merit of evincing the identity of this common element. Also it may seem to offer attractive possibilities of integrating various types of discourse in its promise of partial assimilation of interrogatives and imperatives to the model of truth-valuable (...) language. Even so, Leonard's account is not altogether satisfactory. I shall not discuss his treatment of imperatives but shall argue that his conception of interrogatives has unacceptable consequences. (shrink)