The aim of this paper is technically to study Belnap's four-valued sentential logic . First, we obtain a Gentzen-style axiomatization of this logic that contains no structural rules while all they are still admissible in the Gentzen system what is proved with using some algebraic tools. Further, the mentioned logic is proved to be the least closure operator on the set of {Λ, V, ⌝}-formulas satisfying Tarski's conditions for classical conjunction and disjunction together with De Morgan's laws for negation. It (...) is also proved that Belnap's logic is the only sentential logic satisfying the above-mentioned conditions together with Anderson-Belnap's Variable-Sharing Property. Finally, we obtain a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic. As a consequence, we obtain a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of Priest's logic of paradox. (shrink)

This paper explores allowing truth value assignments to be undetermined or "partial" and overdetermined or "inconsistent", thus returning to an investigation of the four-valued semantics that I initiated in the sixties. I examine some natural consequence relations and show how they are related to existing logics, including ukasiewicz's three-valued logic, Kleene's three-valued logic, Anderson and Belnap's relevant entailments, Priest's "Logic of Paradox", and the first-degree fragment of the Dunn-McCall system "R-mingle". None of these systems have nested implications, and I investigate (...) twelve natural extensions containing nested implications, all of which can be viewed as coming from natural variations on Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic. Many of these logics exist antecedently in the literature, in particular Nelson 's "constructible falsity". (shrink)

We give a set of postulates for the minimal normal modal logicK + without negation or any kind of implication. The connectives are simply , , , . The postulates (and theorems) are all deducibility statements . The only postulates that might not be obvious are.

This paper contains some contributions to the study of Belnap's four-valued logic from an algebraic point of view. We introduce a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic, along with its well-known semantical presentation, and a Gentzen calculus that slightly differs from the usual one in that it is closer to Anderson and Belnap's formalization of their “logic of first-degree entailments”. We prove several Completeness Theorems and reduce every formula to an equivalent normal form. The Hilbert-style presentation allows us to characterize (...) the Leibniz congruence of the matrix models of the logic, and to find that the class of algebraic reducts of its reduced matrices is strictly smaller than the variety of De Morgan lattices. This means that the links between the logic and this class of algebras cannot be fully explained in terms of matrices, as in more classical logics. It is through the use of abstract logics as models that we are able to confirm that De Morgan lattices are indeed the algebraic counterpart of Belnap's logic, in the sense of Font and Jansana's recent theory of full models for sentential logics. Among other characterizations, we prove that its full models are those abstract logics that are finitary, do not have theorems, and satisfy the metalogical properties of Conjunction, Disjunction, Double Negation, and Weak Contraposition. As a consequence, we find that the Gentzen calculus presented at the beginning is strongly adequate for Belnap's logic and is algebraizable in the sense of Rebagliato and Verdú, having the variety of De Morgan lattices as its equivalent algebraic semantics. (shrink)

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

In the paper we explore the idea of describing Pawlak’s rough sets using three-valued logic, whereby the value t corresponds to the positive region of a set, the value f — to the negative region, and the undefined value u — to the border of the set. Due to the properties of the above regions in rough set theory, the semantics of the logic is described using a non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix). With the strong semantics, where only the value t is (...) treated as designated, the above logic is a “common denominator” for Kleene and Łukasiewicz 3-valued logics, which represent its two different “determinizations”. In turn, the weak semantics—where both t and u are treated as designated—represents such a “common denominator” for two major 3-valued paraconsistent logics. We give sound and complete, cut-free sequent calculi for both versions of the logic generated by the rough set Nmatrix. Then we derive from these calculi sequent calculi with the same properties for the various “determinizations” of those two versions of the logic (including Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic). Finally, we show how to embed the four above-mentioned determinizations in extensions of the basic rough set logics obtained by adding to those logics a special two-valued “definedness” or “crispness” operator. (shrink)

We study an application of gaggle theory to unary negative modal operators. First we treat negation as impossibility and get a minimal logic system Ki that has a perp semantics. Dunn 's kite of different negations can be dealt with in the extensions of this basic logic Ki. Next we treat negation as “unnecessity” and use a characteristic semantics for different negations in a kite which is dual to Dunn 's original one. Ku is the minimal logic that has a (...) characteristic semantics. We also show that Shramko's falsification logic FL can be incorporated into some extension of this basic logic Ku. Finally, we unite the two basic logics Ki and Ku together to get a negative modal logic K-, which is dual to the positive modal logic K+ in [7]. Shramko has suggested an extension of Dunn 's kite and also a dual version in [12]. He also suggested combining them into a “united” kite. We give a united semantics for this united kite of negations. (shrink)

This paper contains some contributions to the study of Belnap's four-valued logic from an algebraic point of view. We introduce a finite Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic, along with its well-known semantical presentation, and a Gentzen calculus that slightly differs from the usual one in that it is closer to Anderson and Belnap's formalization of their “logic of first-degree entailments”. We prove several Completeness Theorems and reduce every formula to an equivalent normal form. The Hilbert-style presentation allows us to characterize (...) the Leibniz congruence of the matrix models of the logic, and to find that the class of algebraic reducts of its reduced matrices is strictly smaller than the variety of De Morgan lattices. This means that the links between the logic and this class of algebras cannot be fully explained in terms of matrices, as in more classical logics. It is through the use of abstract logics as models that we are able to confirm that De Morgan lattices are indeed the algebraic counterpart of Belnap's logic, in the sense of Font and Jansana's recent theory of full models for sentential logics. Among other characterizations, we prove that its full models are those abstract logics that are finitary, do not have theorems, and satisfy the metalogical properties of Conjunction, Disjunction, Double Negation, and Weak Contraposition. As a consequence, we find that the Gentzen calculus presented at the beginning is strongly adequate for Belnap's logic and is algebraizable in the sense of Rebagliato and Verdú, having the variety of De Morgan lattices as its equivalent algebraic semantics. (shrink)

In his paper 'Generalised Ortho Negation' [2] J.Michael Dunn mentions a claim of mine to the effect that there is no condition on 'perp frames' equivalent to the holding of double negation elimination ∼∼A ⊩ A. That claim is wrong. In this paper I correct my error and analyse the behaviour of conditions on frames for negations which verify a number of different theses.