The lively debate over the constitutional foundations of judicial review has been marred by a formalism which obscures its point and value.ed from genuine issues of substance, the rival positions offer inadequate accounts of the legitimacy of judicial review; constitutional theory must regain its connection with questions of political principle and moral value. Although the critics of ultra vires have rightly emphasized the foundational role of the common law, they have misconceived its nature and implications. On the one hand, they (...) have invited the charge of judicial supremacism by marginalizing the role of legislative intent; on the other, their affirmation of absolute parliamentary sovereignty (within the context of this debate) undermines the critique of ultra vires. In substance, therefore, the rival camps occupy essentially the same ground, equally trapped by a formalism that entrenches a stark confrontation between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. A conception of shared sovereignty, or interdependent sovereignties, provides a better foundation for judicial review. (shrink)

Drawing upon Hannah Arendt's and Carl Schmitt's theories on the relationship between nomos and boundary, this paper revisits how constitutionalism and political power are reconciled as constitutional ordering. It first analyzes constitutionalism in the light of political modernity. Indicating that political power grounded by constitutions is omnipotent, complementing and completing constitutionalism, the paper contends that an omnipotent constitutional ordering is anything but an unleashed Leviathan. It is argued that constitutional omnipotence is framed and thus constrained by a constitutional nomos, the (...) matrix of which is a dual delimitation of boundaries, generational, and jurisdictional. (shrink)

By giving legislatures broad power to override constitutional rights provisions, recent Commonwealth rights charters are said to create a new ‘weaker’ model of constitutional rights protection than the traditional US model of strong-form judicial review. The article, however, argues that to date such powers have rarely if ever been used by Commonwealth legislatures, and thus have had little direct effect on the strength of judicial review in Commonwealth countries. At most, such powers may have had some indirect effect on the (...) strength of review in the Commonwealth, compared to the United States, by encouraging greater deference by courts such as the Supreme Court of Canada to attempts by parliament to engage in ‘dialogue’ via ordinary legislative means. This more limited—and contingent—view of Commonwealth–US constitutional difference also has clear practical implications, the article suggests, for ongoing attempts to ‘borrow’ or adopt the new Commonwealth constitutional model elsewhere. (shrink)

Drawing upon Hannah Arendt's and Carl Schmitt's theories on the relationship between nomos and boundary, this paper revisits how constitutionalism and political power are reconciled as constitutional ordering. It first analyzes constitutionalism in the light of political modernity. Indicating that political power grounded by constitutions is omnipotent, complementing and completing constitutionalism, the paper contends that an omnipotent constitutional ordering is anything but an unleashed Leviathan. It is argued that constitutional omnipotence is framed and thus constrained by a constitutional nomos, the (...) matrix of which is a dual delimitation of boundaries, generational, and jurisdictional. (shrink)