Many theorists of the ‘political turn’ in animal rights theory emphasize the need for animals’ interests to be considered in political decision-making processes, but deny that this requires self-representation and participation by animals themselves. I argue that participation by domesticated animals in co-authoring our shared world is indeed required, and explore two ways to proceed: 1) by enabling animal voice within the existing geography of human-animal roles and relationships; and 2) by freeing animals into a revitalized public commons where citizens (...) encounter one another in spontaneous, unpredictable encounters in spaces that they can re-shape together. (shrink)

Two distinct approaches to the incorporation of animal interests within democratic theory are identified. The first, anthropocentric, account suggests that animal interests ought to be considered within a democratic polity if and when enough humans desire this to be the case. Within this anthropocentric account, the relationship between democracy and the protection of animal interests remains contingent. An alternative account holds that the interests of animals ought to be taken into account because they have a democratic right that their interests (...) are considered. This alternative account is defended in this article by utilising democratic theory and, in particular, the all-affected principle. The interests of animals are affected by collective decisions and, therefore, they, or – more specifically – their representatives, have a democratic right to have some say in the making of those decisions. This approach is favourably contrasted with an alternative, citizenship, account which relies on contested, capacity-oriented, claims current within the field of animal ethics. (shrink)

While animal rights have been a central topic within moral philosophy since the 1970s, it has remained virtually invisible within political philosophy. This article explores two key reasons for the difficulties in locating animals within political philosophy. First, even if animals are seen as having intrinsic moral status, they are often seen as ultimately distant others or strangers, beyond the bounds of human society. Insofar as political philosophy focuses on the governing of a shared social life, animals are seen as (...) falling outside its remit. Second, even if animals are recognized as members of society, they are seen as lacking the capacities or competences said to be essential for politics, and for membership in the demos. We challenge both assumptions. Many animals live and work alongside us, within an interspecies society, and all members of society should have the right to shape decisions about how that society is governed. An interspecies society requires interspecies politics. (shrink)

Despite achieving broad acceptance of the moral case for treating animals fairly, the animal rights movement has reached an impasse concerning legal rights for animals. Zoopolis proposes a new approach to addressing this failure: integrating animal interests into human society via political institutions and practices. Zoopolis’s central theory that humans owe animals citizenship rights in a shared human-animal society, but that acceptance of responsibilities by animals also is required, has merit for the advancement of animal rights discourse. But its anthropocentric (...) approach, which itself exerts power over animals, necessitating suppression and policing of animals’ natural behavior, is problematic. (shrink)

In this chapter, I defend the claim that if nonhuman animals have certain basic moral rights, then this requires that we extend to them what I call “full political standing.” Full political standing includes legal rights, legal standing so others can bring legal suits on behalf of animals, and some form of institutionalized political representation. I argue that only if we incorporate other animals into our legal and political institutions in these ways will humans be able to effectively protect and (...) uphold their basic moral rights. I finish by considering a few objections to extending political inclusion to other animals in these ways. (shrink)

For more than two centuries, human workers in both the United Kingdom and Australia have been afforded some level of protection at work by occupational or work health and safety legislation. Concurrently, the legislative protection of animals has grown from a bare recognition of some as legitimate objects for protection from cruelty to a space where many species are deemed sentient beings. However, current animal welfare legislation in Australia and elsewhere exempt some classes of animals from protection and allow some (...) questionable practices that result in animals suffering in a range of environments. One such environment is, arguably, the workplace. While work health and safety legislation aims to make workplaces and systems of work safe for people, animals who work are not captured by this legislation in Australia. In this article, I argue that work health and safety legislation should take a new, contemporary, and inclusive approach by relinquishing outdated anthropocentric perspectives and recognizing the role of animals as workers and their need for workplace regulation and protection. The proposed reform of the work health and safety legislation would incorporate animal work health and safety by, as a minimum, extending the current definition of “workers” to include animals who work. (shrink)

This Article presents a new paradigm, premised on the equal protection principle, for the legal regulation of domestic animals: Equal Protection of Animals (EPA). EPA combines the insights of vulnerability theorists with the equal protection principle and capability theory, to create a mechanism for recognizing the equal claims of human and nonhuman animals to protections against suffering. Under such an approach, domestic animals, like humans, have claims to sufficient food, hydration, and shelter; bodily integrity (including avoiding pain); companionship; and the (...) ability to exercise and to engage in natural behaviors. Existing animal welfare and anti-cruelty laws, despite their stated purposes, fail to adequately protect animals. This Article identifies the ontology of the problem as interest-convergence, famously described by Derrick Bell in the desegregation context. The privileged (humans in this case) protect the disadvantaged (animals) only when their interests align. Because humans profit economically and socially from the exploitation of animals, interests often diverge. When this divergence occurs, all protections for animals are placed in jeopardy. Unlike protections for other disadvantaged groups, there is no constitutional or other legal floor guarding the basic liberties of animals. Interest converge results in what I term “legal gerrymandering for human use,” or the redrawing of the natural baseline of protections for animals, to further human use of animals. In addition to undermining fundamental protections for animals against abuse and suffering, legal gerrymandering creates inconsistencies that violate legal norms of precedent and procedure. Specifically, I address differential treatment of animals of the same legal and species classes as well as different treatment of scientific evidence in the animal law as opposed to other legal contexts. While some scholars seek to address the problem of inadequate animal protections, their proposals - treating animals as legal persons or quasi property - suffer two shortcomings. First, under traditional rights- and interests- based reforms, strong human rights or interests in using animals will always trump animal rights or interests, even with regard to avoiding some types of suffering. Second, existing scholarship is entrenched in a paralyzing debate about whether categorizing animals as “persons” instead of “property” will improve their legal protections. EPA does not have these limitations. EPA seeks to maximize the basic capabilities of human and nonhuman animals within the same population, addressing the hierarchy problem. Human claims to maximize basic capabilities cannot be valued above nonhuman animal claims for the same. Further, EPA directly considers animal capacities without regard to category; there is no need to categorize animals as persons or as a special form of property. (shrink)