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Concept Nativism and Neural Plasticity

In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), The Conceptual Mind: New Directions in the Study of Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 117-147 (2015)

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  1. Functional neuroimaging of theory of mind.Jorie Koster-Hale & Rebecca Saxe - 2013 - In Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo & Helen Tager-Flusberg (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives From Developmental Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 132.
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  • Linguistics and philosophy.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1969 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Language and philosophy. [New York]: New York University Press.
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  • Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1985 - Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
    We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘ theory of mind ’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘ theory ’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer (...)
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  • A Framework for the Psychology of Norms.Chandra Sripada & Stephen Stich - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), Innate Mind: Volume 2: Culture and Cognition. , US: Oup Usa.
    Humans are unique in the animal world in the extent to which their day-to-day behavior is governed by a complex set of rules and principles commonly called norms. Norms delimit the bounds of proper behavior in a host of domains, providing an invisible web of normative structure embracing virtually all aspects of social life. People also find many norms to be deeply meaningful. Norms give rise to powerful subjective feelings that, in the view of many, are an important part of (...)
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  • Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity.David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.
    Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...)
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  • Birth of the Mind: How a Tiny Number of Genes Creates the Complexity of Human Thought.Gary Marcus - 2004 - Basic Books.
    A psychologist offers a detailed study of the genetic underpinnings of human thought, looking at the small number of genes that contain the instructions for building the vastly complex human brain to determine how these genes work, common misconceptions about genes, and their implications for the future of genetic engineering. 30,000 first printing.
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  • Innateness and the brain.Steven R. Quartz - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):13-40.
    The philosophical innateness debate has long relied onpsychological evidence. For a century, however, a parallel debate hastaken place within neuroscience. In this paper, I consider theimplications of this neuroscience debate for the philosophicalinnateness debate. By combining the tools of theoretical neurobiologyand learning theory, I introduce the ``problem of development'' that alladaptive systems must solve, and suggest how responses to this problemcan demarcate a number of innateness proposals. From this perspective, Isuggest that the majority of natural systems are in fact innate. (...)
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  • The present status of the innateness controversy.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 257-316.
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  • Radical concept nativism.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 2002 - Cognition 86 (1):25-55.
    Radical concept nativism is the thesis that virtually all lexical concepts are innate. Notoriously endorsed by Jerry Fodor (1975, 1981), radical concept nativism has had few supporters. However, it has proven difficult to say exactly what’s wrong with Fodor’s argument. We show that previous responses are inadequate on a number of grounds. Chief among these is that they typically do not achieve sufficient distance from Fodor’s dialectic, and, as a result, they do not illuminate the central question of how new (...)
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  • The return of concept empiricism.Jesse J. Prinz - 2005 - In H. Cohen & C. Leferbvre (eds.), Categorization and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    In this chapter, I outline and defend a version of concept empiricism. The theory has four central tenets: Concepts represent categories by reliable causal relations to category instances; conceptual representations of category vary from occasion to occasion; these representations are perceptually based; and these representations are all learned, not innate. The last two tenets on this list have been central to empiricism historically, and the first two have been developed in more recent years. I look at each in turn, and (...)
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  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  • The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
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  • Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants.Dan Sperber & Stefania Caldi - unknown
    In two experiments, we investigated whether 13-month-old infants expect agents to behave in a way consistent with information to which they have been exposed. Infants watched animations in which an animal was either provided information or prevented from gathering information about the actual location of an object. The animal then searched successfully or failed to retrieve it. Infants’ looking times suggest that they expected searches to be effective when—and only when—the agent had had access to the relevant information. This result (...)
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  • Linguistics and cognitive science: Problems and mysteries.Noam Chomsky - 1991 - In Aka Kasher (ed.), The Chomskyan Turn. Blackwell. pp. 26--53.
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  • The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature.Steven Pinker - 2002 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (4):765-767.
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  • (1 other version)False-belief understanding in infants.Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott & Zijing He - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110-118.
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  • Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism.Alan M. Leslie & Laila Thaiss - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):225-251.
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  • The Language of Thought.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1975 - Noûs 14 (1):120-124.
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  • Do 10-month-old infants understand others’ false beliefs?Yuyan Luo - 2011 - Cognition 121 (3):289-298.
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  • Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, by Jerry A. Fodor. [REVIEW]R. De Clercq - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3):609-612.
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