Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):592-596.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   133 citations  
  • On the reality of cognitive illusions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):582-591.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   151 citations  
  • How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (4):684-704.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   265 citations  
  • (1 other version)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1709 citations  
  • The Character of Physical Law.Richard Phillips Feynman - 1965 - MIT Press.
    The law of gravitation, an example of physical law The relation of mathematics to physics The great conservation principles Symmetry in physical law The distinction of past and future Probability and uncertainty: the quantum mechanical view of nature Seeking new laws.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   327 citations  
  • Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty.L. Cosmides - 1996 - Cognition 58 (1):1-73.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   143 citations  
  • Précis of simple heuristics that make us Smart.Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):727-741.
    How can anyone be rational in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury? Traditional models of unbounded rationality and optimization in cognitive science, economics, and animal behavior have tended to view decision-makers as possessing supernatural powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and endless time. But understanding decisions in the real world requires a more psychologically plausible notion of bounded rationality. In Simple heuristics that make us smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • Simple heuristics could make us smart; but which heuristics do we apply when?Richard Cooper - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):746-746.
    Simple heuristics are clearly powerful tools for making near optimal decisions, but evidence for their use in specific situations is weak. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) suggest a range of heuristics, but fail to address the question of which environmental or task cues might prompt the use of any specific heuristic. This failure compromises the falsifiability of the fast and frugal approach.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reliability and Justification.Richard Feldman - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):159-174.
    According to a simple version of the reliability theory of epistemic justification, a belief is justified if and only if the process leading to that belief is reliable. The idea behind this theory is simple and attractive. There are a variety of mental or cognitive processes that result in beliefs. Some of these processes are reliable—they generally yield true beliefs—and the beliefs they produce are justified. Other processes are unreliable and the beliefs they produce are unjustified. So, for example, reliable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • Content-blind norms, no norms, or good norms? A reply to Vranas.Gerd Gigerenzer - 2001 - Cognition 81 (1):93-103.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (1):75-90.
    [Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 109 of Psychological Review. Due to circumstances that were beyond the control of the authors, the studies reported in "Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic," by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer overlap with studies reported in "The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart," by the same authors and with studies reported in "Inference From Ignorance: The Recognition Heuristic". In addition, Figure 3 in the Psychological Review article (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations