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Why the Standard View of Ignorance Prevails

Pierre Le Morvan

Philosophia 41 (1):239-256 (2013)

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Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan.Rik Peels - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):345-355.details In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is lack (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 34 citations
What is ignorance?Rik Peels - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):57-67.details This article offers an analysis of ignorance. After a couple of preliminary remarks, I endeavor to show that, contrary to what one might expect and to what nearly all philosophers assume, being ignorant is not equivalent to failing to know, at least not on one of the stronger senses of knowledge. Subsequently, I offer two definitions of ignorance and argue that one’s definition of ignorance crucially depends on one’s account of belief. Finally, I illustrate the relevance of my analysis by (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 50 citations
Presumptive meanings: the theory of generalized conversational implicature.Stephen C. Levinson - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details When we speak, we mean more than we say. In this book Stephen C. Levinson explains some general processes that underlie presumptions in communication. Download Export citation Bookmark 429 citations
On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View.Pierre Le Morvan - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):379-393.details Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation. Download Export citation Bookmark 33 citations
On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels.Pierre LeMorvan - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):335-344.details Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge. Download Export citation Bookmark 39 citations
The New View on Ignorance Undefeated.Rik Peels - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):741-750.details In this paper, I provide a defence of the New View, on which ignorance is lack of true belief rather than lack of knowledge. Pierre Le Morvan has argued that the New View is untenable, partly because it fails to take into account the distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. I argue that propositional ignorance is just a subspecies of factive ignorance and that all the work that needs to be done can be done by using the concept of factive (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 27 citations

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