Is science unified or disunified? This collection brings together contributions from prominent scholars in a variety of scientific disciplines to examine this important theoretical question. They examine whether the sciences are, or ever were, unified by a single theoretical view of nature or a methodological foundation and the implications this has for the relationship between scientific disciplines and between science and society.

This paper examines the relationship between simulation and experiment. Many discussions of simulation, and indeed the term "numerical experiments," invoke a strong metaphor of experimentation. On the other hand, many simulations begin as attempts to apply scientific theories. This has lead many to characterize simulation as lying between theory and experiment. The aim of the paper is to try to reconcile these two points of viewto understand what methodological and epistemological features simulation has in common with experimentation, while at the (...) same time keeping a keen eye on simulation's ancestry as a form of scientific theorizing. In so doing, it seeks to apply some of the insights of recent work on the philosophy of experiment to an aspect of theorizing that is of growing philosophical interest: the construction of local models. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn its reconstruction of scientific practice, philosophy of science has traditionally placed scientific theories in a central role, and has reduced the problem of mediating between theories and the world to formal considerations. Many applications of scientific theories, however, involve complex mathematical models whose constitutive equations are analytically unsolvable. The study of these applications often consists in developing representations of the underlying physics on a computer, and using the techniques of computer simulation in order to learn about the behavior (...) of these systems. In many instances, these computer simulations are not simple number-crunching techniques. They involve a complex chain of inferences that serve to transform theoretical structures into specific concrete knowledge of physical systems. In this paper I argue that this process of transformation has its own epistemology. I also argue that this kind of epistemology is unfamiliar to most philosophy of science, which has traditionally concerned itself with the justification of theories, not with their application. Finally, I urge that the nature of this epistemology suggests that the end results of some simulations do not bear a simple, straightforward relation to the theories from which they stem. (shrink)

Es soll ein Beitrag zur epistemischen Charakterisierung von Computersimulationen als jenseits von Experiment und Theorie geleistet werden. Es wird argumentiert, dass die in der Simulationstechnik eingesetzten Verfahren nicht numerische Lösungen liefern, sondern deren Dynamik mittels generativer Mechanismen imitieren. Die Computersimulationen in der Klimatologie werden als systematisches wie historisches Fallbeispiel behandelt. Erst "Simulationsexperimente" gestatten es, mittels Modellen eine Dynamik zu imitieren, ohne deren Grundgleichungen zu "lösen". /// Computer simulations will be characterized in epistemic respect as a method between experiment and theory. (...) It will be argued that simulations do not provide numerical solutions, rather they use generative mechanisms to imitate a dynamics. Climate science will be considered as a case both systematically and historically. Only simulation experiments allow to build models that imitate a dynamics without solving the relevant equations. (shrink)

An early example is von Neumann's and Charney's Princeton Meteorological Project in the period 1946–53 which ended with daily numerical prediction in less than 2 hours. After this stage, the questions of long-range forecasting and general circulation of the atmosphere became of greater importance. The late 1950s saw the emergence of an alternative: were atmospheric models used mainly for prediction or understanding? This controversial debate in particular occurred during an important colloquium in Tokyo in 1960 which gathered together J. Charney, (...) E. Lorenz, A. Eliassen, and B. Saltzman, among others, and witnessed discussions on statistical methods for predictions and/or maximum simplification of dynamic equations. This phase ended in 1963 with Lorenzs seminal paper on “Deterministic non periodic flows.”. (shrink)

Es soll ein Beitrag zur epistemischen Charakterisierung von Computersimulationen als jenseits von Experiment und Theorie geleistet werden. Es wird argumentiert, dass die in der Simulationstechnik eingesetzten Verfahren nicht numerische Lösungen liefern, sondern deren Dynamik mittels generativer Mechanismen imitieren. Die Computersimulationen in der Klimatologie werden als systematisches wie historisches Fallbeispiel behandelt. Erst "Simulationsexperimente" gestatten es, mittels Modellen eine Dynamik zu imitieren, ohne deren Grundgleichungen zu "lösen". /// Computer simulations will be characterized in epistemic respect as a method between experiment and theory. (...) It will be argued that simulations do not provide numerical solutions, rather they use generative mechanisms to imitate a dynamics. Climate science will be considered as a case both systematically and historically. Only simulation experiments allow to build models that imitate a dynamics without solving the relevant equations. (shrink)