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Choice Isn’t Simple. Reply to Pickard

Neuroethics 10 (1):181-183 (2017)

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  1. Voluntary involuntariness: Thought suppression and the regulation of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & James A. K. Erskine - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):684-694.
    Participants were asked to carry out a series of simple tasks while following mental control instructions. In advance of each task, they either suppressed thoughts of their intention to perform the task, concentrated on such thoughts, or monitored their thoughts without trying to change them. Suppression resulted in reduced reports of intentionality as compared to monitoring, and as compared to concentration. There was a weak trend for suppression to enhance reported intentionality for a repetition of the action carried out after (...)
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  • Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  • Q: Is Addiction a Brain Disease or a Moral Failing? A: Neither.Nick Heather - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):115-124.
    This article uses Marc Lewis’ work as a springboard to discuss the socio-political context of the brain disease model of addiction (BDMA). The claim that promotion of the BDMA is the only way the general public can be persuaded to withhold blame and punishment from addicts is critically examined. After a discussion of public understandings of the disease concept of addiction, it is pointed out that it is possible to develop a scientific account of addiction which is neither a disease (...)
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  • Responsibility without Blame for Addiction.Hanna Pickard - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):169-180.
    Drug use and drug addiction are severely stigmatised around the world. Marc Lewis does not frame his learning model of addiction as a choice model out of concern that to do so further encourages stigma and blame. Yet the evidence in support of a choice model is increasingly strong as well as consonant with core elements of his learning model. I offer a responsibility without blame framework that derives from reflection on forms of clinical practice that support change and recovery (...)
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  • Intertemporal Bargaining in Habit.George Ainslie - 2016 - Neuroethics 10 (1):143-153.
    Lewis ascribes the stubborn persistence of addictions to habit, itself a normal process that does not imply lack of responsiveness to motivation. However, he suggests that more dynamic processes may be involved, for instance that “our recurrently focused brains inevitably self-organize.” Given hyperbolic delay discounting, a reward-seeking internal marketplace model describes two processes, also normal in themselves, that may give rise to the “deep attachment” to addictive activities that he describes: People learn to interpret current choices as test cases for (...)
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