"This book is about miracles -- what they are, what would count as evidence that they have occurred. It is not primarily concerned with historical evidence about whether certain particular miracles (such as Christ rising from the dead or walking on water) have occurred, but it is primarily concerned with whether historical evidence could show anything about such things and whether it matters if it can. It is concerned with the framework within which a historical debate must be conducted. It (...) contains a selection of writings written from different viewpoints by philosophers, classical and modern. The reader is left to form his or her own view on who wins the argument." [Introduction]. (shrink)

In Water into Wine? Robert Larmer re-examines significant issues in this cross-disciplinary debate and attacks two basic assumptions governing it.

IN HIS ESSAY IN VOLUME 11 OF "RELIGIOUS STUDIES", CHRYSSIDES MAINTAINS THAT OUR USUAL CONCEPT OF MIRACLE IS INCOHERENT BECAUSE AN EVENT CANNOT BOTH VIOLATE A SCIENTIFIC LAW AND BE ATTRIBUTED TO AN AGENT. AGAINST THIS VIEW IT IS ARGUED THAT WE DISTINGUISH A MIRACLE FROM A MERE CURIOSITY AND ALSO ATTRIBUTE THE MIRACLE TO AN AGENT NOT ON THE BASIS OF A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT BUT RATHER BY ASKING WHAT PURPOSE THE EVENT MIGHT SERVE.

It is argued that Hume’s definition of miracle stands in need of revision because it fails to be inclusive of acts of supernatural intervention in the world which are non-law-violating. Potential revisions of the definition, due to Paul Dietl and Christopher Hughes are considered and found to be inadequate, and a new definition is put forward; a miracle is "an intended outcome of an intervention in the natural world by a supernatural agent." An objection to this definition is anticipated and (...) a distinction is made between miracles and magic in order to address the objection. (shrink)

THREE CONCEPTS OF MIRACLE ARE EXAMINED: INTERVENTION MIRACLE, CONTINGENCY MIRACLE, AND NATURAL MIRACLE. IT IS ARGUED THAT EACH CONCEPT OF MIRACLE IS COHERENT. REGARDING THE FAMILIAR CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION MIRACLE, IT IS ARGUED THAT PROBLEMS RELATING TO GOD’S INTERVENING IN THE COURSE OF NATURE, RAISED BY HUME AND OTHERS, CAN BE OVERCOME. THEN IT IS SHOWN THAT IN ANY CASE THERE ARE TWO OTHER COHERENT CONCEPTS OF MIRACLE--CONTINGENCY AND NATURAL MIRACLES--EACH OF WHICH BY ITSELF GIVES US SOME GRASP OF HOW (...) A TRANSCENDENT GOD CAN HAVE A PRESENCE IN THE WORLD. (shrink)

(I UNDERSTAND BY A MIRACLE, A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE BY A GOD.) A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A NON-REPEATABLE COUNTER-INSTANCE TO IT. CONTRARY TO HUME’S VIEW, THERE COULD BE GOOD HISTORICAL EVIDENCE BOTH THAT A VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS DUE TO THE ACT OF A GOD.

In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly, I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive than Mumford’s causation-based definition.

The first is that a miracle, understood as an event produced by a transcendent agent overriding the usual course of nature, involves a violation of the laws of nature. Larmer argues that events are explained by reference to both relevant laws and units of mass/energy in the sequences to be explained. He contends that a miracle need not be conceived as involving a violation of natural law, but rather as the creation or annihilation of mass/energy by a transcendent agent. In (...) reply to the objection that this account would violate the first law of thermo-dynamics, he distinguishes two forms of the principle -- one metaphysical, one scientific -- and aruges that a miracle would not violate the principle considered as a scientific law. The second assumption is that miracle testimony cannot serve as evidence for theism. Larmer demonstrates that the logical ties connecting the concept of miracle to theism need not imply that one must be a theist to evaluate miracle testimony properly. All that is required is that one is prepared to entertain theism as a hypothesis. Attacking these assumptions allows Larmer to show that Humean balance-of-probabilities arguments, based on a presumed conflict between evidence which establishes belief in the laws of nature and evidence in favour of miracles, miss the point if miracles need not be defined as violations of the laws of nature. He argues that, in the absence of a general argument demonstrating that the testimonial evidence in favour of miracles conflicts with the evidence for the laws of nature, it is up to the atheist to demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, why the testimonial evidence is to be rejected. His conclusion is that, contrary to what is usually thought, the burden of proof lies not upon the shoulders of the theist, but upon the shoulders of the atheist. (shrink)

The status of religion in the modern world is intimately related to the rise of science. The clearest way of getting at this relation is to consider the issue of miracle. Given the success of scientists in predicting and controlling natural phenomena, many of the leading theologians of the modern era abandoned the understanding of miracle as a supernatural violation of natural regularities. They conceded the capacity of scientists to offer natural explanations of phenomena that are naturally observable and shifted (...) their theological focus from the observable patterns of nature to morality, religious experience, and history. Although many liberal and existentialistic theologians affirmed the miraculous, especially with regard to the Resurrection, they avoided a head on collision with science. (shrink)

Creation and conservation are defined and distinguished; providence based on divine middle knowledge is defended; and miracles as naturally impossible events are defended.

The writing of yet another paper on miracles probably stands in need of justification. The justification I wish to claim has two aspects. Firstly, I think that the concepts of the miraculous usually defended and, in turn, criticized, are unacceptable and that a better one is available. Secondly, and more importantly, I think that these unacceptable concepts produce in virtue of their inherent weaknesses a situation in which only the less important questions get asked about miracles. These questions are those (...) which relate to the ontological status of miracles. I think it can be shown that is is the epistemological questions about miracles which are more interesting and important and, furthermore, that the standard accounts are so hemmed in by the difficulties raised for them that a preoccupation with ontological questions characterizes most discussion. (shrink)

SINCE THE TIME OF HUME, A MIRACLE HAS MOST FREQUENTLY BEEN DEFINED IN PHILOSOPHICAL CIRCLES AS A VIOLATION OF A NATURAL LAW CAUSED BY A GOD. I ARGUE THAT THERE IS A MEANINGFUL SENSE IN WHICH IT CAN BE SAID THAT A NATURAL LAW HAS BEEN VIOLATED. BUT I FURTHER ARGUE THAT SINCE AN EVENT CAN ONLY BE A VIOLATION IN THIS SENSE IF IT IS NOT CAUSED BY A GOD, NO MIRACLE CAN BE SAID TO BE A VIOLATION OF (...) A NATURAL LAW. (shrink)

David Hume’s arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context-dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science. (edited).

In this paper, I argue that miracles should not be defined as involving violations of natural laws. They should be defined as signs of particular volitions of the deity or of other supernatural agents. I suggest that one may, without any prior belief in the existence of such supernatural agents, reasonably come to believe that one has witnessed miracles.