The study of metaphysical possibility involves two central questions: What are possible worlds? Is there an empty possible world? In looking at the first question we consider the different accounts of possible worlds—Lewisian realism, ersatzism, etc. In looking at the second question we consider the discussions of metaphysical nihilism, the modal ontological arguments, etc. In this paper I am drawing these two questions together in order to show how the position we hold on one of these issues affects the position (...) we should hold on the other. (shrink)

I distinguish between two opposing intuitions about the nature of the singular causal relation. The first stresses the nomological character of causation, while the second emphasises is seemingly local character. My question is this: is it possible to formulate an account of causation which incorporates both intuitions? Anscombe gives us reason to think that these intuitions could not be jointly met in an account of causation. Foster and Tooley's acount seems to provide a counter‐instance to her claim, but this proves (...) to be a false start. I put forward an alternative suggestion which, by utilising tropes, manages to reconcile both the local and nomological character of causation. (shrink)

Tested the 2-process theory of detection, search, and attention presented by the current authors in a series of experiments. The studies demonstrate the qualitative difference between 2 modes of information processing: automatic detection and controlled search; trace the course of the learning of automatic detection, of categories, and of automatic-attention responses; and show the dependence of automatic detection on attending responses and demonstrate how such responses interrupt controlled processing and interfere with the focusing of attention. The learning of categories is (...) shown to improve controlled search performance. A general framework for human information processing is proposed. The framework emphasizes the roles of automatic and controlled processing. The theory is compared to and contrasted with extant models of search and attention. (shrink)

Gewohnheitshandlungen stellen für die kausale Handlungstheorie eine Herausforderung dar: Einerseits werden sie offenkundig auf weite Strecken nicht durch vorgängige bewusste Wünsche gesteuert. Andererseits glauben wir, dass dabei der Akteur in der Regel über sie diejenige Form von Kontrolle ausübt, die sie als seine absichtlichen Handlungen qualifiziert. Somit kann es den Anschein haben, dass Gewohnheitshandlungen entscheidende Gegenbeispiele für eine Theorie liefern, die die für Absichtlichkeit entscheidende Handlungskontrolle an die Verursachung durch bewusste Wünsche bindet. Der Artikel untersucht drei einschlägige Typen von routinemäßig (...) ausgeführten Handlungen: erstens komplexe Alltagshandlungen wie Autofahren oder Ins-Bett-Gehen, die häufig 'geistesabwesend' vollzogen werden; zweitens Routinen, die, wie die Vorführung eines Akrobaten, aus eingeschliffenen körperlichen Sequenzen bestehen, deren erfolgreiche Ausführung die Abwesenheit bewusster Interventionen geradezu erfordert; und drittens 'gedankenlos' ausgeübte Mikrohandlungssequenzen wie das Herumprobieren mit einem Schlüssel im Schlüsselloch. Es zeigt sich nicht nur, dass alle drei Handlungstypen einer kausalen Analyse zugänglich sind, sondern auch dass ihre Analyse wichtige Dimensionen des Phänomens der Handlungskontrolle zutage fördert. (shrink)

Redish et al. trace vulnerabilities in habit and planning systems almost exclusively to pharmacological effects of addictive substances on underlying brain systems. As we discuss, however, these systems also can be disrupted by purely psychological factors inherent in normal decision-making and everyday behavior. A truly unified model must integrate the contribution of both sets of factors in driving addiction.

This reissue was first published in 1978. Anthony Kenny, one of the most distinguished philosophers in England, explores the notion of responsibility and the precise place of the mental element in criminal actions. Bringing the insights of recent philosophy of mind to bear on contemporary developments in criminal law, he writes with the general reader in mind, no specialist training in philosophy being necessary to appreciate his argument. Kenny shows that abstract distinctions drawn by analytic philosophers are relevant to decisions (...) in matters of life and death, and illustrates the philosophical argument throughout by reference to actual legal cases. The topics he covers are of wide general interest and include: mens rea and mental health, strict liability, freedom and determinism, duress and necessity, intoxication and irresistible impulse, intention and purpose, murder and rape, punishment and deterrence, witchcraft and supernatural beliefs. (shrink)

Many philosophers of action, including Bratman and Mele, conceive intentions functionally, as executive states: intentions are mental states that represent an action and tend to cause this action. In the philosophical tradition (e.g. for Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant) another function of intentions, which may be called “volitive”, played a much more prominent role: intentions are mental states that represent what kind of actions we want and prefer to be realised and thus, in a possibly rational way, synthesise our motivational, (...) desiderative, and perhaps affective as well as cognitive attitudes towards this action. This paper argues that intentions must fulfil both functions and then develops a concept of ‘intention’ that integrates both functions. One reason for including the volitive function in the definition of ‘intention’ is that only via this function the value of actions as such is realised, namely to enable the person, the kernel of the self to express herself and to control the world. Various forms of dissociation of the two functions are discussed and a proposal how to deal with such cases in the definition of ‘intention’ is developed. (shrink)

In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the necessity of reckoning with intentions in philosophy of action a strategy for deciding empirically between competing theories of intention is exposed and applied for criticizing various philosophical theories of intention, among others that of Bratman. The hypothesis that intentions are optimality beliefs is defended on the basis of empirical decision theory. Present empirical decision theory however does not provide an empirically satisfying elaboration of the (...) desirability concepts used in these optimality beliefs. Based on process theories of deliberation two hypotheses for filling this gap are developed. (shrink)

Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.

Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript].