The authors analyze the responses to a mail survey of securities analysts who were asked about their ethical behavior and the ethical behavior of people with whom they work. The findings show the types of ethical violations that occur and the frequency with which they occur. The findings also show how respondents deal with observed violations of ethical behavior. All responses are analyzed to determine if differences exist between the responses of analysts having different characteristics (gender, age, years of employment, (...) and education), and differences in employment circumstances (firm size, firm type, buy side/sell side, U.S./Canada). (shrink)

Regulators have recently relaxed some provisions of the Global Research Analyst Settlement of 2003 and associated reforms, which arose from charges that conflicts of interest within investment banks had induced the issuance of fraudulent or otherwise misleading analyst research reports. We examine the effectiveness of the Global Settlement in reducing the systematic optimism observed in stock recommendations of analysts whose employer is a merger and acquisition advisor for the covered firm, by comparing the optimism exhibited in stock recommendations issued by (...) these analysts and by unaffiliated analysts before and after the Global Settlement. To control for the impact on analyst optimism of other time varying factors, our sample includes cases from the US and from other countries in which the Global Settlement had no direct impact. We argue that if the Global Settlement was effective, there should be a reduction in the relative optimism of affiliated analysts following this reform, and that reduction in the relative optimism should be greater for affiliated US analysts, than for affiliated analysts from non-US countries. When optimism is measured over a 180-day period surrounding the M&A announcement, we find a significantly greater reduction in US affiliated analysts’ optimism than occurs outside the US. However, evidence regarding analysts’ optimism in the 90-day period prior to the announcement of an M&A deal is mixed. (shrink)

The last years have seen a surge of scandals in financial intermediation. This article argues that the agency structure inherent to most forms of financial intermediation gives rise to conflicts of interest. Though this does not excuse scandalous behavior it points out market imperfections. There are four types of conflicts of interest: personal-individual, personal-organizational, impersonal-individual, and finally, impersonal-organizational conflicts. Analyzing recent scandals we find that all four types of conflicts of interest prevail in financial intermediation.

Herding behavior occurs when security analysts ignore their private opinions and issue public forecasts that mimic the earnings forecasts of others. Joining the consensus provides cover for analysts' reputations. We question the ethics of this practice when the motive to protect one's reputation takes precedence over the forecase accuracy motive. While seemingly predictable behavior from a self interested perspective, herding behavior has subtle but long term ramifications for the efficient pricing of securities and the preservation of the public trust in (...) the financial services profession. We call upon each individual analyst as well as the profession to exercise the moral courage necessary to cultivate a climate of personal and public integrity. Personal resistance and pro-active policies are prescribed as actions to assist analysts to become more cognizant of their motivations, as well as to promote a more ethical professional context. (shrink)

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging managerial misconduct, which can moderate agency problems. On the other hand, analysts may increase the fraud incentive factor by pressurizing managers to achieve short-term performance targets, which can exacerbate agency problem. In either case, the potential influence of analysts on the fraud (...) rationalization factor may be more pronounced among firms that are more dependent on the capital market for corporate finance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we show a negative association between corporate fraud propensity and analyst coverage, and that this effect is more pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises, which are more reliant on the stock market for external funding. These findings suggest that analyst coverage contributes to corporate fraud deterrence in emerging economies characterized by weak investor protection. The main policy implication is that further development of the analyst profession in emerging economies may benefit investors and strengthen business ethics. (shrink)