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  1. Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and (...)
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  • Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
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  • Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
    An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, (...)
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  • The cognitive functions of language.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):657-674.
    This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong and others as uninterestingly weak. Strong forms dismissed include the view that language is conceptually necessary for thought (endorsed by many philosophers) and the view that language is _de facto_ the medium of all human conceptual thinking (endorsed by many philosophers and social scientists). Weak forms include (...)
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  • Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
    The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question have not, in my view, been (...)
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  • Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding.Brian Hare, Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2006 - Cognition 101 (3):495-514.
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  • (1 other version)Replication and functionalism.Jane Heal - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--150.
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  • Functionalism and replication.Jane Heal - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • Primate Cognition.Amanda Seed & Michael Tomasello - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):407-419.
    As the cognitive revolution was slow to come to the study of animal behavior, the vast majority of what we know about primate cognition has been discovered in the last 30 years. Building on the recognition that the physical and social worlds of humans and their living primate relatives pose many of the same evolutionary challenges, programs of research have established that the most basic cognitive skills and mental representations that humans use to navigate those worlds are already possessed by (...)
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  • How infants make sense of intentional action.Amanda L. Woodward, Jessica A. Sommerville & Jose J. Guajardo - 2001 - In Bertram F. Malle, Louis J. Moses & Dare A. Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 149--169.
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  • Motivation is not enough.Derek E. Lyons, Webb Phillips & Laurie R. Santos - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):708-708.
    Tomasello et al. provide a new account of cultural uniqueness, one that hinges on a uniquely human motivation to share intentionality with others. We favor an alternative to this motivational account – one that relies on a modular explanation of the primate intention-reading system. We discuss this view in light of recent comparative experiments using competitive intention-reading tasks.
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