Abstract: In this article, I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, which I call enlightened value maximization. Enlightened value maximization utilizes much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or value seeking as the firm’s objective. This proposal therefore solves the problems that arise (...) from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, which is the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory, explaining how this theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard that gives no score—that is, no single-valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organization or division (and it must be consistent with the organization’s strategy), and as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organization it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm. (shrink)

In an increasingly complex world with increasingly powerful organisations it seems inevitable that society – or groups in society – would become anxious about whether these organisations could be encouraged to match that power with an appropriate responsibility. This is the function of accountability – to require individuals and organisations to present an account of those actions for which society holds them – or would wish to hold them – responsible. And the history of social accounting, at its most fundamental, (...) is a history of attempts to develop this accountability. It seems to me that the widespread and systematic practice of social and environmental accounting is a deeply essential element in any well‐functioning, complex democracy. The corollary is that the absence of such mechanisms raises fundamental questions about the nature of modern democracies. This article briefly outlines what I believe to be the three strands of social accounting. It then identifies a few of the lessons that we may be able to learn from current experience and, in particular, how social accounting is related to accountability, democracy and sustainability. The central issue of the tension between accountability and control is touched upon: I then illustrate how the stakeholder model can be used to help define the social account, and conclude with a few words on attestation. (shrink)

In a departure from the traditional studies of corporate philanthropy that focus on board composition, advertising, and social networks, the authors investigate the financial correlates of corporate philanthropy. The research design controls for firm size and industry while observing firms from a variety of industries. The sample contains matched pairs of generous and less generous corporate givers. The authors find, as hypothesized, a positive relationship between a firm''s cash resources available and cash donations, but no significant relationship between corporate philanthropy (...) and firm financial performance, regardless of whether corporate philanthropy is measured as cash payouts or the aggregate contributions that charities actually receive, and regardless of whether financial performance is gauged using accounting measures or market measures. Whereas the link between available resources and corporate philanthropy is well accepted in the literature on corporate social responsibility, it has been rarely tested and never so definitively found as in this research. (shrink)

Abstract:In this article we first review the development of the concept of global business citizenship and show how the libertarian political philosophy of free-market capitalism must give way to a communitarian view in order for the voluntaristic, local notion of “corporate citizenship” to take root. We then distinguish the concept of global business citizenship from “corporate citizenship” by showing how the former concept requires a transition from communitarian thinking to a position of universal human rights. In addition, we link global (...) business citizenship to global business strategy and to three analytical levels of ethical norms. Finally, we trace a process whereby global businesses can implement fundamental norms and learn to accommodate to legitimate cultural differences. (shrink)

This study examined the influence of corporate giving programs on the link between certain categories of corporate crime and corporate reputation. Specifically, firms that violate EPA and OSHA regulations should, to some extent, experience a decline in their reputations, while firms that contribute to charitable causes should see their reputations enhanced. The results of this study support both of these contentions. Further, the results suggest that corporate giving significantly moderates the link between the number of EPA and OSHA violations committed (...) by a firm and its reputation. Thus, while a firm's reputation can be diminished through its violation of various government regulations, the extent of the decline in reputation may be significantly reduced through charitable giving. (shrink)

This paper reviews the development of socially responsible investment (SRI) over recent years and highlights the prospects for an increasingly strong connection with the practice of corporate social responsibility. The paper argues that not only has SRI grown significantly, it has also matured. In particular, it has become an investment philosophy adopted by a growing proportion of large investment institutions. This shift in SRI from margin to mainstream and the position in which institutional investors find themselves is leading to a (...) new form of SRI shareholder pressure. Although this bears some resemblance to lobbying campaigns which might take advantage of shareholder rights, we seek to distinguish it as an important phenomenon in its own right — one to which corporate executives are likely to be paying increasing attention in the years to come. We further argue that this approach potentially meets some of the earlier ethical criticisms of certain forms of SRI but, ironically, probably owes its existence to those pioneering approaches. We conclude with some suggestions for further research to inform discussion of the issues highlighted in the paper. (shrink)

Despite rich theoretical development, empirical research on stakeholder management is scant, save its relationship with financial performance. Recent research shows significant intrafirm variability in stakeholder management across time. This study seeks to explain why firms would experience significant changes in stakeholder management. Adapting Wood’s framework to discuss three principles of stakeholder management, the authors identify antecedents of change at the institutional, organizational, and executive levels. Pressures for legitimacy at the institutional level suggest that firm age and size, along with industry (...) shifts in stakeholder management, will increase the likelihood of changes in stakeholder management for the focal firm. The authors posit that organizational risk and performance will also affect the likelihood of change, as will managerial discretion, ownership, and succession. The authors test their predictions using a longitudinal sample of stakeholder management data and discuss the implications of the findings for research and practice. (shrink)

Having the ambition to contribute to the practical value of the theory on corporate social performance (CSP), this paper approaches the question whether CSP can contribute to the competitive advantage of firms. We adopted an explorative case-study methodology to explore the variety of positive and negative effects of CSP on the competitiveness of organizations. As this study aimed at identifying as great variety of these effects as possible, we selected a diversified group of respondents. Data was thus collected through embedded (...) units of analysis in a petrochemical company, and triangulated with the opinions of experts on CSP. Overall, we found various positive and negative effects of CSP on the competitiveness of organizations. CSP is therefore not an innocent adventure for executives, but rather a strategy for achieving corporate objectives. If not carefully implemented, the CSP strategy may harm the competitive advantage of the firm, as our results have suggested. (shrink)

Prior studies have advanced our knowledge of the individual determinants of corporate philanthropy; however, little empirical research has been conducted on how these determinants combine to influence giving. In this study, the authors develop and test an integrated model of the relationship between firm resources and corporate philanthropy as mediated by managerial discretion and managerial values. In addition, the authors offer organizational slack as an alternative measure of organizational resources. As predicted, the results show that firm resources have a positive (...) effect on corporate philanthropy. This effect is fully mediated by managerial discretion and partially mediated by managerial values. (shrink)

In an increasingly complex world with increasingly powerful organisations it seems inevitable that society – or groups in society – would become anxious about whether these organisations could be encouraged to match that power with an appropriate responsibility. This is the function of accountability – to require individuals and organisations to present an account of those actions for which society holds them – or would wish to hold them – responsible. And the history of social accounting, at its most fundamental, (...) is a history of attempts to develop this accountability. It seems to me that the widespread and systematic practice of social and environmental accounting is a deeply essential element in any well‐functioning, complex democracy. The corollary is that the absence of such mechanisms raises fundamental questions about the nature of modern democracies. This article briefly outlines what I believe to be the three strands of social accounting. It then identifies a few of the lessons that we may be able to learn from current experience and, in particular, how social accounting is related to accountability, democracy and sustainability. The central issue of the tension between accountability and control is touched upon: I then illustrate how the stakeholder model can be used to help define the social account, and conclude with a few words on attestation. (shrink)

This study investigates financial correlates of corporate philanthropy in Fortune 1000 companies using structural equation modeling. The results suggest that cash flow (one of the most discretionary types of organizational slack) has a significant impact on a firm’s cash donations to charitable causes, but monetary donations do not affect firm financial performance. These findings support the accepted view of corporate philanthropy as a discretionary social responsibility and the traditional thinking about firm giving in the business and society literature—that doing well (...) enables doing good. Contrary to some contemporary thinking, the findings imply no significant effect on profits from corporate generosity. (shrink)

In this article, we hypothesize that the level of environmentally oriented noncompliance regulatory fines and penalties levied on companies and on their industry counterparts will be associated with the development of an environmental infrastructure and practices within these companies. We find that the presence of these regulatory actions is associated with the likelihood of companies reporting environmental policies and activities and with the presence of a separate board of directors’ committee that monitors company environmental concerns. Our findings suggest that environmental (...) regulatory pressure may serve as a driver of environmental action but is not its only determinant. (shrink)