According to Aristotelian essentialism, the nature of an organism is constituted of a particular goal-directed disposition to produce an organism typical of its kind. This paper argues—against the prevailing orthodoxy—that essentialism of this sort is indispensable to evolutionary biology. The most powerful anti-essentialist arguments purport to show that the natures of organisms play no explanatory role in modern synthesis biology. I argue that recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Developmental biology shows that one must appeal to (...) the capacities of organisms to explain what makes adaptive evolution adaptive. Moreover, the specific capacities in question are precisely those that, according to Aristotle, constitute the nature of an organism. Essentialism 1.1 Aristotelian biological kinds Evolutionary anti-essentialism 2.1 Taxonomic anti-essentialism 2.2 Explanatory anti-essentialism Adaptation 3.1 Stability 3.2 Mutability 3.3 Phenotypic plasticity and adaptive evolution The natures of organisms Conclusion. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr has argued that Darwinian theory discredited essentialist modes of thought and replaced them with what he has called "population thinking". In this paper, I characterize essentialism as embodying a certain conception of how variation in nature is to be explained, and show how this conception was undermined by evolutionary theory. The Darwinian doctrine of evolutionary gradualism makes it impossible to say exactly where one species ends and another begins; such line-drawing problems are often taken to be the decisive (...) reason for thinking that essentialism is untenable. However, according to the view of essentialism I suggest, this familiar objection is not fatal to essentialism. It is rather the essentialist's use of what I call the natural state model for explaining variation which clashes with evolutionary theory. This model implemented the essentialist's requirement that properties of populations be defined in terms of properties of member organisms. Requiring such constituent definitions is reductionistic in spirit; additionally, evolutionary theory shows that such definitions are not available, and, moreover, that they are not needed to legitimize population-level concepts. Population thinking involves the thesis that population concepts may be legitimized by showing their connections with each other, even when they are not reducible to concepts applying at lower levels of organization. In the paper, I develop these points by describing Aristotle's ideas on the origins of biological variation; they are a classic formulation of the natural state model. I also describe how the development of statistical ideas in the 19th century involved an abandoning of the natural state model. (shrink)

In the carefully argued central chapters of Adapting Minds, Buller scrutinizes several of evolutionary psychology's most highly publicized "...

Three eminent scientists analyze the scientific, social, and political roots of biological determinism.

David Buller’s recent book, _Adapting Minds_, is a philosophical critique of the field of evolutionary psychology. Buller argues that evolutionary psychology is utterly bankrupt from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Although _Adapting Minds _has been well received in both the academic press and the popular media, we argue that Buller’s critique of evolutionary psychology fails.

In "Primate visions" schetst de wetenschapshistorica Donna Haraway de evolutie van de primatologie van de jaren 20 tot de jaren 80. Primaten lijken zozeer op mensen dat zij het onderzoeksobject bij uitstek vormen waarop wetenschappers, bewust of onbewust, hun ideeën over natuur en cultuur projecteren. Tegelijk is de primatologie een wetenschap waar ongewoon veel vrouwen in betrokken zijn. Haraway grijpt deze twee gegevens aan om uitvoerig in te gaan op het thema van vrouwen in de wetenschap, op de wetenschappelijke constructie (...) van gender, maar ook op de wisselwerking tussen ras, klasse en (post)koloniale cultuur enerzijds en het 'westerse' natuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek anderzijds.Zij argumenteert dat de economische, politieke en culturele overtuigingen van de onderzoekers de studie en de kennis van primaten sterk beïnvloeden. Ze legt de maatschappelijke doelstellingen en de ideologische overtuigingen bloot waardoor onderzoeksprogramma's gestuurd worden. Tegelijk verdedigt ze de stelling dat ook de levende wezens die gewoonlijk als 'natuur' beschouwd worden (apen en 'primitieve' mensen) zelf actief participeren in de creatie van kennis omtrent de natuur. Haraway's betoog is bovendien doorspekt met beschrijvingen van primaten in de populaire cultuur, gaande van science fiction verhalen tot documentaires van National Geographic. De auteur plaatst al deze verschillende perspectieven naast zonder ze te willen reduceren tot één, samenhangende, uniforme realiteit. Deze postmoderne, gefragmenteerde visie op de geschiedenis beschouwt Haraway als een complex en interessant alternatief voor de traditionele, causale geschiedschrijving. (shrink)