Edna Ullmann-Margalit provides an original account of the emergence of norms. Her main thesis is that certain types of norms are possible solutions to problems posed by certain types of social interaction situations. She presents illuminating discussions of Prisoners' Dilemma, co-ordination, and inequality situations.

The comprehension of norms in complex social systems is one of the most active fields of research in agent-based modelling. This is faced with the challenge to comprehend the recursive interaction between inter- and intra-agent processes. In this article, a comparative analysis of selected cases of normative agent architectures will be given based on a review of theories of norms in the social sciences. This allows to identify the prerequisites for a representation of the cognitive processes of norm recognition. As (...) yet, there is no unequivocal concept for the design of normative agents. Different approaches are compared along the line of different theoretical accounts. (shrink)

This paper proposes an approach to investigate norm-governed learning agents which combines a logic-based formalism with an equation-based counterpart. This dual formalism enables us to describe the reasoning of such agents and their interactions using argumentation, and, at the same time, to capture systemic features using equations. The approach is applied to norm emergence and internalisation in systems of learning agents. The logical formalism is rooted into a probabilistic defeasible logic instantiating Dung’s argumentation framework. Rules of this logic are attached (...) with probabilities to describe the agents’ minds and behaviours as well as uncertain environments. Then, the equation-based model for reinforcement learning, defined over this probability distribution, allows agents to adapt to their environment and self-organise. (shrink)

The innovative and revolutionary scholarship of the eminent Austrian legal theorist and professor of Roman law, Eugen Ehrlich, is of a very high..

In this paper we present some concepts and their relations that are necessary for modeling autonomous agents in an environment that is governed by some (social) norms. We divide the norms over three levels: the private level the contract level and the convention level. We show how deontic logic can be used to model the concepts and how the theory of speech acts can be used to model the generation of (some of) the norms. Finally we give some idea about (...) an agent architecture incorporating the social norms based on a BDI framework. (shrink)

In this paper, a model of norms as cognitive objects is applied to establish connections between social conventions and prescriptions. Relevant literature on this issue, especially found in AI and the social sciences, will be shown to suffer from a dychotomic view: a conventionalistic view proposed by rationality and AI scientists; and a prescriptive view proposed by some philosophers of law (Kelsen 1934/1979, Hart 1961, Ross, 1958).In the present work, the attempt is made to fill the gap between these views (...) by putting forward a hypothesis concerning the process from perceived behavioural regularities to normative assumptions. The emergence of norms will be here seen as intrinsically intertwined with the emergence of normative beliefs. Unlike that assumed by the conventionalistic sight, the process of emergence is seen as a non-continuous phenomenon. A given behavioural regularity will be argued to give rise to a normative belief if and as long as that regularity is believed to be prescribed within the community. Two corollaries of this hypothesis will be examined: (1) unlike that implied by the conventionalistic view, the spreading of norms is not only due to a passive behavioural social influence (imitation) but also to an active cognitive one (the spreading of normative wants and beliefs); (2) unlike that assumed by the prescriptive view, a norm is not necessarily explicitly and deliberately issued by some normative authority, but is grounded upon the norm-addressees' beliefs that they are generally prescribed to comply with it. (shrink)

In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are most (...) likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in most modern societies. (shrink)

The 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. (...) This unexpected victory proved that cooperation - one might even say altruism - is mathematically possible and therefore needs no hidden hand or divine agent to create and sustain it. A great roadblock to the understanding of all sorts of behavior was at last removed. The updated edition includes an extensive new chapter on cooperation in cancer cells and among terrorist organizations. (shrink)