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  1. Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results.Zoltan Dienes - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:85883.
    No scientific conclusion follows automatically from a statistically non-significant result, yet people routinely use non-significant results to guide conclusions about the status of theories (or the effectiveness of practices). To know whether a non-significant result counts against a theory, or if it just indicates data insensitivity, researchers must use one of: power, intervals (such as confidence or credibility intervals), or else an indicator of the relative evidence for one theory over another, such as a Bayes factor. I argue Bayes factors (...)
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  • Bayesian inference for psychology. Part I: Theoretical advantages and practical ramifications.M. Marsman, T. Jamil, A. Ly, J. Verhagen, J. Love, R. Selker, Q. F. Gronau, M. V. Smíra, S. Epskamp, D. Matzke, E. J. Wagenmaker, J. N. Rouder & R. D. Morey - 2018 - Psyconomic Bulletin and Review 25 (1):35-57.
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  • Who Should Be Afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox?Aris Spanos - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):73-93.
    The article revisits the large n problem as it relates to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox to compare the frequentist, Bayesian, and likelihoodist approaches to inference and evidence. It is argued that what is fallacious is to interpret a rejection of as providing the same evidence for a particular alternative, irrespective of n; this is an example of the fallacy of rejection. Moreover, the Bayesian and likelihoodist approaches are shown to be susceptible to the fallacy of acceptance. The key difference is that (...)
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  • On the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox.Christian P. Robert - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (2):216-232,.
    This article discusses the dual interpretation of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox associated with Bayesian posterior probabilities and Bayes factors, both as a differentiation between frequentist and Bayesian statistics and as a pointer to the difficulty of using improper priors while testing. I stress the considerable impact of this paradox on the foundations of both classical and Bayesian statistics. While assessing existing resolutions of the paradox, I focus on a critical viewpoint of the paradox discussed by Spanos in Philosophy of Science.
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  • Chevalley-Goodrich.[author unknown] - 1990 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (4):1520-1560.
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