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  1. (1 other version)Intentional action in ordinary language: Core concept or pragmatic understanding?Fred Adams & Annie Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentional action in ordinary language: core concept or pragmatic understanding?F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173-181.
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  • The folk concept of intentionality.Joshua Knobe & Bertram Malle - 1997 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121.
    When perceiving, explaining, or criticizing human behavior, people distinguish between intentional and unintentional actions. To do so, they rely on a shared folk concept of intentionality. In contrast to past speculative models, this article provides an empirically-based model of this concept. Study 1 demonstrates that people agree substantially in their judgments of intentionality, suggesting a shared underlying concept. Study 2 reveals that when asked to directly define the term intentional, people mention four components of intentionality: desire, belief, intention, and awareness. (...)
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  • Intentional action and moral considerations: still pragmatic.F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):268-276.
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