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  1. Perception of randomness and predicting uncertain events.Tadeusz Tyszka, Piotr Zielonka, Raymond Dacey & Przemys - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):83 – 110.
    Using randomly generated sequences of binary events we asked participants to make predictions about the next event. It turned out that while predicting uncertain events, people do not behave unsystematically. Our research identifies four types of relatively consistent strategies for predicting uncertain binary events: a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run majority events, hereafter called the long-run momentum strategy ; a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run (...)
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  • Modeling Behavior in a Clinically Diagnostic Sequential Risk-Taking Task.Thomas S. Wallsten, Timothy J. Pleskac & C. W. Lejuez - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (4):862-880.
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  • Perception of randomness and predicting uncertain events.Przemysław Sawicki, Raymond Dacey, Piotr Zielonka & Tadeusz Tyszka - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):83-110.
    Using randomly generated sequences of binary events we asked participants to make predictions about the next event. It turned out that while predicting uncertain events, people do not behave unsystematically. Our research identifies four types of relatively consistent strategies for predicting uncertain binary events: a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run majority events, hereafter called the long-run momentum strategy ; a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run (...)
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  • Do Causal Beliefs Influence the Hot-Hand and the Gambler's Fallacy?Giorgio Gronchi & Steven A. Sloman - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1164--1168.
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