Switch to: Citations

References in:

Moral Worth and Supererogation

Ethics 126 (3):690-710 (2016)

Add references

You must login to add references.

Against satisficing consequentialism.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (2):97-108.details The move to satisficing has been thought to help consequentialists avoid the problem of demandingness. But this is a mistake. In this article I formulate several versions of satisficing consequentialism. I show that every version is unacceptable, because every version permits agents to bring about a submaximal outcome in order to prevent a better outcome from obtaining. Some satisficers try to avoid this problem by incorporating a notion of personal sacrifice into the view. I show that these attempts are unsuccessful. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 62 citations
Varieties of moral worth and moral credit.Holly M. Smith - 1991 - Ethics 101 (2):279-303.details Download Export citation Bookmark 47 citations
Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.details In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that moral reasons morally (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 39 citations
Saints, heroes, sages, and villains.Julia Markovits - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):289-311.details This essay explores the question of how to be good. My starting point is a thesis about moral worth that I’ve defended in the past: roughly, that an action is morally worthy if and only it is performed for the reasons why it is right. While I think that account gets at one important sense of moral goodness, I argue here that it fails to capture several ways of being worthy of admiration on moral grounds. Moral goodness is more multi-faceted. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 27 citations
What Kant might have said: Moral worth and the overdetermination of dutiful action.Richard G. Henson - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (1):39-54.details My purpose is to account for some oddities in what Kant did and did not say about "moral worth," and for another in what commentators tell us about his intent. The stone with which I hope to dispatch these several birds is-as one would expect a philosopher's stone to be-a distinction. I distinguish between two things Kant might have had in mind under the heading of moral worth. They come readily to mind when one both takes account of what he (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 51 citations

1