In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in (...) turn, show why philosophers should argue with humility. (shrink)

Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First, evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well-researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model (...) of philosophical expertise based on the limitations of genuine experts may suggest a series of constraints on the reliability of professional philosophical intuition. Even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. — Bertrand Russell, On the Value of Scepticism. (shrink)

We review several instances where cognitive research has identified distinct psychological mechanisms for moral judgment that yield conflicting answers to moral dilemmas. In each of these cases, the conflict between psychological mechanisms is paralleled by prominent philosophical debates between different moral theories. A parsimonious account of this data is that key claims supporting different moral theories ultimately derive from the psychological mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments. If this view is correct, it has some important implications for the practice (...) of philosophy. We suggest several ways that moral philosophy and practical reasoning can proceed in the face of discordant theories grounded in diverse psychological mechanisms. (shrink)

Maurice Walshe. This is the wheel—marks clearly show. If he does not renounce the world, He'll turn the Wheel, and rule the earth. The nobles will his vassals be, All in attendance on his power. But if the homeless life's his choice: On ...

This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly susceptible to belief (...) systems that are structurally self-validating. On this cognitive-psychological basis, we construct an epidemiology of beliefs, arguing that the apparent convenience of escape clauses and other defensive ?tactics? used by believers may well derive not from conscious deliberation on their part, but from more subtle mechanisms of cultural selection. (shrink)

If explicit cognition about morality promotes moral behavior then one might expect ethics professors to behave particularly well. However, professional ethicists' behavior has never been empirically studied. The present research examined the rates at which ethics books are missing from leading academic libraries, compared to other philosophy books similar in age and popularity. Study 1 found that relatively obscure, contemporary ethics books of the sort likely to be borrowed mainly by professors and advanced students of philosophy were actually about 50% (...) more likely to be missing than non-ethics books. Study 2 found that classic (pre-1900) ethics books were about twice as likely to be missing. (shrink)

Does expertise within a domain of knowledge predict accurate self-assessment of the ability to explain topics in that domain? We find that expertise increases confidence in the ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena. However, this confidence is unwarranted; after actually offering full explanations, people are surprised by the limitations in their understanding. For passive expertise, miscalibration is moderated by education; those with more education are accurate in their self-assessments. But when those with more education consider topics related to (...) their area of concentrated study, they also display an illusion of understanding. This “curse of expertise” is explained by a failure to recognize the amount of detailed information that had been forgotten. While expertise can sometimes lead to accurate self-knowledge, it can also create illusions of competence. (shrink)

Dans le but de d�fendre la th�se de la correspondance entre le comportement moral et le bonheur, j�analyse dans cet article le cas probl�matique des psychopathes. Les psychopathes sont des individus qui ne reculent devant aucun interdit moral pour satisfaire leurs d�sirs, et qui ne ressentent aucun remord ou scrupule face � leurs agissements. En ce sens, ils paraissent obtenir un ��ticket gratuit�� dans le domaine de la moralit�. Comment un d�fenseur de la th�se de la correspondance entre moralit� et (...) bonheur peut-il rendre compte du cas du psychopathe? Le psychopathe vient-il r�futer cette th�se, ou repr�sente-t-il plut�t une exception l�gitime? Je d�fendrai ici une solution alternative �; apr�s avoir propos� une version plausible de la th�se de la correspondance, je tenterai de d�montrer que les psychopathes ne sont pas heureux, et ce en vertu de caract�ristiques essentielles de la psychopathie. Leur statut de ��criminel en puissance�� et leur faible capacit� de contentement sont les deux �l�ments centraux qui m�am�neront � conclure que les psychopathes ne sont pas heureux. Loin de r�futer ou d��chapper � la th�se de la correspondance, le cas des psychopathes vient donc en r�alit� renforcer cette th�se. -/- My goal in this paper is to defend the idea of a general correspondence between happiness and morality, and I do so by analyzing the problematic case of psychopaths. Psychopaths are individuals who are not bothered by moral restrictions when it comes to satisfying their desires. They feel no remorse and have no scruples, and as such they appear to be �free-riders� in the realm of morality. The unusual case of psychopaths will therefore pose a problem to someone who argues that there is a correspondence between happiness and morality: should psychopaths be seen as refuting the correspondence rule, or are they merely a legitimate exception to that rule? I will propose an alternative explanation; after having presented a plausible version of the correspondence thesis, I will try to show that psychopaths, for reasons constitutive of their nature, really are not happy. Psychopaths� quasi-inevitable criminal behaviours as well as their low capacity for contentment are two central elements that lead me to argue that they are not happy. I therefore conclude that psychopaths, far from refuting the correspondence thesis, actually reinforce that thesis. (shrink)

The _Platform Sutra_ records the teachings of Hui-neng, the Sixth Patriarch, who is revered as one of the two great figures in the founding of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism. This translation is the definitive English version of the eighth-century Ch'an classic. Phillip B. Yampolsky has based his translation on the Tun-huang manuscript, the earliest extant version of the work. A critical edition of the Chinese text is given at the end of the volume. Dr. Yampolsky also furnishes a lengthy and detailed (...) historical introduction which contains much information hitherto unavailable even to scholars, and provides the context essential to an understanding of Hui-neng's work. He gives an account of the history and legends of Ch'an Buddhism, with particular attention to the traditions associated with Hui-neng, quoting or summarizing the most important narratives. He then discusses the various texts of the _Platform Sutra_, and analyzes its contents. (shrink)

One of the core teachings of Buddhism is the doctrine of anattā. I argue that there is good evidence that anattā as understood in early Buddhism should be viewed less as a doctrine and a metaphysical pronouncement than as a soteriological claim – an appeal and a method to achieve, or move progressively closer to, liberation. This view opens up anattā to empirical scrutiny – does un-selfing, as an act, lead to liberation? Neuroimaging data collected on Buddhist or Buddhism-inspired meditators (...) show interesting correspondences with this view of not-self as a possibly soteriological strategy. First, meditation leads to a quieting of the narrative self. Second, this quieting of the narrative self seems to lead to at least momentary increases in well-being. Third, this process can be learned, and seems to be already underway after a mere 40 hours of experience. Finally, very highly accomplished meditators seem to be able to tune down even the core self and truly experience anattā, including an apparent subduing of reflexive awareness. (shrink)

The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue that the analogy with (...) science still motivates a default assumption of philosophical expertise; however, the expertise so motivated is not expertise in intuition, and its existence would not suffice to answer the experimentalist challenge. I'll also suggest that there are deep parallels between the current methodological crisis in philosophy and the decline of introspection-based methods in psychology in the early twentieth century. The comparison can give us insight into the possible future evolution of philosoph.. (shrink)

The “expertise defense” is the claim that philosophers have special expertise that allows them to resist the biases suggested by the findings of experimental philosophers. Typically, this defense is backed up by an analogy with expertise in science or other academic fields. Recently, however, studies have begun to suggest that philosophers' intuitions may be just as subject to inappropriate variation as those of the folk. Should we conclude that the expertise defense has been debunked? I'll argue that the analogy with (...) science still motivates a default assumption of philosophical expertise; however, the expertise so motivated is not expertise in intuition, and its existence would not suffice to answer the experimentalist challenge. I'll also suggest that there are deep parallels between the current methodological crisis in philosophy and the decline of introspection-based methods in psychology in the early twentieth century. The comparison can give us insight into the possible future evolution of philosophical methodology. (shrink)