Switch to: Citations

References in:

Evidence is Required for Religious Belief

In Michael Peterson & Ray VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2nd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 269-278 (2019)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Religious Epistemology.Chris Tweedt & Trent Dougherty - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (8):547-559.
    Religious epistemology is the study of how subjects' religious beliefs can have, or fail to have, some form of positive epistemic status and whether they even need such status appropriate to their kind. The current debate is focused most centrally upon the kind of basis upon which a religious believer can be rationally justified in holding certain beliefs about God and whether it is necessary to be so justified to believe as a religious believer ought. Engaging these issues are primarily (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Natural signs and knowledge of God: a new look at theistic arguments.C. Stephen Evans - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Is there such a thing as natural knowledge of God? C. Stephen Evans presents the case for understanding theistic arguments as expressions of natural signs in order to gain a new perspective both on their strengths and weaknesses. Three classical, much-discussed theistic arguments - cosmological, teleological, and moral - are examined for the natural signs they embody. At the heart of this book lie several relatively simple ideas. One is that if there is a God of the kind accepted by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • (1 other version)Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2017 - Synthese:1-18.
    The epistemic value of seemings is increasingly debated. Such debates are hindered, however, by a lack of consensus about the nature of seemings. There are four prominent conceptions in the literature, and the plausibility of principles such as phenomenal conservatism, which assign a prominent epistemic role to seemings, varies greatly from one conception to another. It is therefore crucial that we identify the correct conception of seemings. I argue that seemings are best understood as sui generis mental states with propositional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations