- On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.details
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Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.details
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Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.details
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Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.details
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Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.details
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On The Plurality of Worlds.Graeme Forbes - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):222-240.details
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(1 other version)Causal relations.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.details
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Events as Property Exemplifications.Jaegwon Kim - 1976 - In M. Brand & Douglas Walton (eds.), Action Theory. Reidel. pp. 310-326.details
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A Future for Presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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(1 other version)Theories of actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1974 - Noûs 8 (3):211-231.details
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Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.details
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Causing and Nothingness.Helen Beebee - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 291--308.details
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The Puzzle of Change.Mark Hinchliff - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:119-136.details
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Causation by disconnection.Jonathan Schaffer - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):285-300.details
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Presentism and ontological commitment.Theodore Sider - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (7):325-347.details
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(1 other version)A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oxford University Press.details
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Presentism.Thomas M. Crisp - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Causation and the flow of energy.David Fair - 1979 - Erkenntnis 14 (3):219 - 250.details
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(1 other version)Causal Relations.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Void and Object.David K. Lewis - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 277-290.details
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Causes need not be physically connected to their effects: The case for negative causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 197--216.details
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On presentism and triviality.Thomas M. Crisp - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:15-20.details
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Persistence, parts, and presentism.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):421-438.details
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A counterfactual theory of prevention and 'causation' by omission.Phil Dowe - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.details
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Time and Thisness.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):315-329.details
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(1 other version)Metaphysics: The Big Questions.Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.) - 1991 - Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)Four-dimensionalism.Michael C. Rea - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-59.details
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Events and particulars.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):25-32.details
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Presentism and "Cross-Time" Relations.Thomas M. Crisp - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):5 - 17.details
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Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations.Rafael De Clercq - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386 - 402.details
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(Serious) actualism and (serious) presentism.Michael Bergmann - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):118-132.details
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(1 other version)Four-dimensionalism.Michael C. Rea - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-280.details
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For facts as causes and effects.David H. Mellor - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 309--23.details
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Chisholm and the Essences of Events.Dean Zimmerman - 1997 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 73--100.details
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Going through the open door again: Counterfactual versus singularist theories of causation.D. M. Armstrong - 2001 - In Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 163--176.details
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Is causation a genuine relation?Peter Menzies - 2002 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies. New York: Routledge.details
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