- ``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Prompting challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Assertion and its constitutive norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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