Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Ineffability and nonsense.Peter Sullivan - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):195–223.
    [A. W. Moore] There are criteria of ineffability whereby, even if the concept of ineffability can never serve to modify truth, it can sometimes serve to modify other things, specifically understanding. This allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and those who adopt the new reading recently championed by Diamond, Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, rather than (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • A “resolute” later Wittgenstein?Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (5):649-668.
    Abstract: “Resolute readings” initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well—a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall's Wittgenstein's Private Language (2007) as well as by Phil Hutchinson's “What's the Point of Elucidation?” (2007) and Rom Harré's “Grammatical Therapy and the Third Wittgenstein” (2008). The present article shows that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations