This article examines and assesses Pierre Manent’s critique of the European political project and his concomitant endorsement of the nation-state. It first presents Manent’s basic arguments against the European Union, focusing on his Aristotelian understanding of political forms and his notion of the body politic. Subsequently, it argues that Manent’s position, in part due to its Aristotelian underpinnings, is deeply problematic, in that it disregards the contingency and the element of representation that are necessarily inherent in the foundation of every (...) body politic. As a result, Manent’s critique tends to downplay the contingency of the nation-state and to overplay the contingency of the European Union. (shrink)

When I was an undergraduate in Oxford, we were taught economics almost as though it were a natural science. The subject matter of economics might be different from physics, but only in the way that the subject matter of chemistry or biology is different from physics. The actual results were presented to us as if they were scientific theories. So when we learned that savings equals investment, it was taught in the same tone of voice as one teaches that force (...) equals mass times acceleration. And we learned that rational entrepreneurs sell where marginal cost equals marginal revenue in the way that we once learned that bodies attract in a way that is directly proportional to the product of their mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. At no point was it ever suggested that the reality described by economic theory was dependent on human beliefs and other attitudes in a way that was totally unlike the reality described by physics or chemistry. Some years ago, when I published The Construction of Social Reality, I was aware that it had implications for the ontology of economics, but I was not aware that there had already been an important revival of the tradition of institutional economics. It would be an understatement to say that I welcome this interest in institutions; I enthusiastically support it. But I think that in the institutional literature there is still an unclarity about what exactly an institution is. What is the ontology, the mode of existence, of institutional reality? This article tries to add to this discussion. Economics as a subject matter, unlike physics or chemistry, is largely concerned with institutional facts. Facts about money and interest rates, exchange and employment, corporations and the balance of payments, form the very heart of the subject of economics. When Lionel Robbins, in a classic work, tells us that “Economics is a study of the disposal of scarce commodities,”2 he takes for granted a huge invisible institutional.... (shrink)

There are those who say that the changes in the position of Jean-Paul Sartre from the publication of L'Être et le néant to the appearance of Critique de la raison dialectique constitute a “radical conversion”. Some attribute this conversion to the influence of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Sartre has given support to this claim by acknowledging that Merleau-Ponty taught him politics and in doing so helped to move Sartre from the fierce individualism of his early period to the position which culminated in (...) CRD, a position informed by a much greater appreciation for social entanglement. But what is not clear is that Merleau-Ponty's influence upon Sartre extended to Sartre's fundamental convictions, particularly to his fundamental ontological theses. Kwant tells us that Merleau-Ponty's objections to Sartre in the last days of his life indicate that he believed that Sartre had not altered his ontological views. Sartre has not commented upon that issue. It is of vital interest because Merleau-Ponty explicitly claimed in Les Aventures de la dialectique that Sartre's mistaken political views were a consequence of his mistaken ontological principles. Were this true and were it true that Sartre had not made significant alterations in his ontology, one would expect that Merleau-Ponty would have to have said that Sartre's political views in CRD were similarly mistaken. We know that he did make some comments to that effect but, since Merleau-Ponty's tragic death prevented the full articulation of his latest opinions, we cannot be certain. (shrink)

Some ten years ago I read for the first time the passage from which this contribution draws its title. It marks, for me, something like the beginning of an obsession–but one that only takes me in circles, back to those lines, where I find comfort alongside a certain sense of futility in a passage that I know I will never fully unravel. In this futile return there is a feeling of coming home, but also of a continuous departure which most (...) often leads down familiar paths–all of them leading back to where I started–but also sometimes yielding a new route to travel both vainly, in the hope of a new discovery, and of course in vain, as these new paths always seem to take me back home; if I’m lucky a home that is somewhat altered, not necessarily rendered more or less clear to me but somehow deepened, given an added depth or dimension. But each departure is nonetheless accompanied by a marvelous sensation of quickening, a nervousness or jitteriness that pushes me to literally move, to get up from my desk and pace nervously, a sort of push that must be redirected back into the text from which it emerged. (shrink)