Switch to: Citations

References in:

Found: The Missing Explanation

Analysis 53 (2):100 - 109 (1993)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   411 citations  
  • Causation as a secondary quality.Peter Menzies & Huw Price - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):187-203.
    In this paper we defend the view that the ordinary notions of cause and effect have a direct and essential connection with our ability to intervene in the world as agents.1 This is a well known but rather unpopular philosophical approach to causation, often called the manipulability theory. In the interests of brevity and accuracy, we prefer to call it the agency theory.2 Thus the central thesis of an agency account of causation is something like this: an event A is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   170 citations  
  • Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and the central project of theoretical linguistics.C. J. G. Wright - 1989 - In Noam Chomsky & Alexander George (eds.), Reflections on Chomsky. Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • More responses to the missing-explanation argument.Alexander Miller - 1997 - Philosophia 25 (1-4):331-349.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Realism and response-dependence.Philip Pettit - 1991 - Mind 100 (4):587-626.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   126 citations  
  • Why Logically Equivalent Predicates May Pick out Different Properties.Elliott Sober - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (2):183-189.
    The properties, theoretical magnitudes, and natural kinds which science seeks to characterize, and not the sense or meanings which parts of speech may possess, are the subject of this paper. Many philosophers (e.g., Putnam [1971] and Achinstein [1974]) have agreed that two predicates of different meaning may pick out the same property, but they usually hold that that logically equivalent predicates must pick out the same properties. I propose to deny this thesis. My argument is by way of an example (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations