I deny that Thrasymachus' argument or position in Republic I is confused. He doesn't think that either justice or injustice is either a virtue or a vice. He thinks that justice is a DEvice.

"It is the purpose of this article to attempt to re-examine the account of Thrasymachus' doctrine in Plato's Republic, and to show how it can form a self-consistent whole. [...] In this paper it is maintained that Thrasymachus is holding a form of [natural right]." Note: Volume 40 = new series 9.

I deny that Thrasymachus' argument or position in Republic I is confused. He doesn't think that either justice or injustice is either a virtue or a vice. He thinks that justice is a DEvice.

The encounter between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Republic I is notoriously baffling. Most of what is said seems straightforward, and the issues at stake are ones of common concern, but the argument remains elusive. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature and grounds of this elusiveness, and to show that some of it can be dispelled by a sufficiently free-ranging exegesis that bears in mind the general character of Plato’s writing.