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Duress and culpability

Criminal Justice Ethics 19 (2):3-16 (2000)

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  1. Choice, Character, and Excuse.Michael S. Moore - 1990 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (2):29-58.
    Freud justified his extensive theorizing about dreams by the observation that they were “the royal road” to something much more general: namely, our unconscious mental life. The current preoccupation with the theory of excuse in criminal law scholarship (including my own) can be given a similar justification, for the excuses are the royal road to theories of responsibility generally. The thought is that if we understand why we excuse in certain situations but not others, we will have also gained a (...)
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  • Character, purpose, and criminal responsibility.Michael D. Bayles - 1982 - Law and Philosophy 1 (1):5 - 20.
    This paper explores analyzing criminal responsibility from the Humean position that blame is for character traits. If untoward acts indicate undesirable character traits, then the agent is blameworthy; if they do not, then the actor is not blameworthy — he has an excuse. A distinctive feature of this approach is that that voluntariness of acts is irrelevant to determining blameworthiness.This analysis is then applied to a variety of issues in criminal law. Mens supports inferences to character traits, and the Humean (...)
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  • Choice, character, and criminal liability.R. A. Duff - 1993 - Law and Philosophy 12 (4):345 - 383.
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  • Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law.Leo Katz - 1987 - University of Chicago Press.
    With wit and intelligence, Leo Katz seeks to understand the basic rules and concepts underlying the moral, linguistic, and psychological puzzles that plague the criminal law. "_Bad Acts and Guilty Minds_... revives the mind, it challenges superficial analyses, it reminds us that underlying the vast body of statutory and case law, there is a rationale founded in basic notions of fairness and reason.... It will help lawyers to better serve their clients and the society that permits attorneys to hang out (...)
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  • Duress and criminal responsibility.Craig L. Carr - 1991 - Law and Philosophy 10 (2):161-188.
    While the plea of duress is generally accepted as a defense against criminal prosecution, the reasons why it exonerates are subject to dispute and disagreement. Duress is not easily recognizable as either an excusing or justifying condition. Additionally, duress is generally not permitted as a defense against criminal homicide, though some American jurisdictions allow the defense in felony-murder cases. In this paper, I present an argument for how and why the presence of duress can defeat a finding of criminal responsibility. (...)
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  • Should the Law Distinguish Between Intention and (Mere) Foresight?Michael Gorr - 1996 - Legal Theory 2 (4):359-380.
    Philosophers have long debated whether there is a morally significant difference between acting with the intention of bringing about some state of affairs and acting with the mere awareness that that state of affairs will occur as an unintended side effect of what one is trying to achieve. This controversy is mirrored in the criminal law in a number of places, most notably with respect to the question of whether the mens rea for the crime of murder should require the (...)
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  • Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments*: STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER.Peter Arenella - 1990 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (2):59-83.
    Should a person who cannot appreciate the moral significance of legal norms qualify as a blameworthy actor simply because he has the capacity to comply with them for non-moral reasons? Such a person may lack any empathy for other human beings and view moral norms as arbitrary restraints on his self-interested behavior: does he nevertheless deserve moral blame when he makes an instrumentally “rational choice” to breach a norm governing his action? Should our answers to these questions depend on whether (...)
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  • Duressper Minas as a defence to crime: II. [REVIEW]Anthony Kenny - 1982 - Law and Philosophy 1 (2):197 - 205.
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