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  1. The Moral Standing of Natural Objects.Andrew Brennan - 1984 - Environmental Ethics 6 (1):35-56.
    Human beings are, as far as we know, the only animals to have moral concerns and to adopt moralities, but it would be a mistake to be misled by this fact into thinking that humans are also the only proper objects of moral consideration. I argue that we ought to allow even nonliving things a significant moral status, thus denying the condusion of much contemporary moral thinking. First, I consider the possibilityof giving moral consideration to nonliving things. Second, I put (...)
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  • On being morally considerable.Kenneth E. Goodpaster - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (6):308-325.
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  • (1 other version)A defence of the deep ecology movement.Arne Naess - 1984 - Environmental Ethics 6 (3):265-270.
    There is an international deep ecology social movement with key terms, slogans, and rhetorical use of language comparable to what we find in other activist “alternative” movements today. Some supporters of the movement partake in academic philosophy and have developed or at least suggested philosophies, “ecosophies,” inspired by the movement. R. A. Watson does not distinguish sufficiently between the movement and the philosophical expressions with academic pretensions. As a result, he falsely concludes that deep ecology implies setting man apart from (...)
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