- (1 other version)An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality.Kai von Fintel & Anthony Gillies - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:32-62.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Assertion and the semantics of force-markers.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2004 - In Claudia Bianchi (ed.), the semantics/pragmatics distinction. CSLI. pp. 133--166.details
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Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.details
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(1 other version)An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 32-62.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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(1 other version)``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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The contingent a priori and rigid designators.Keith S. Donnellan - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):12-27.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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(1 other version)Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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The status of the knowledge account of assertion.Frank Hindriks - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Knowledge in and out of context.Kent Bach - 2010 - In Joseph Campbell (ed.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. pp. 105--36.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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(1 other version)``Knowing and Asserting".Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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