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De se beliefs and centred uncertainty

Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science (2018)

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  1. On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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  • The problem of the essential indexical.John Perry - 1979 - Noûs 13 (1):3-21.
    Perry argues that certain sorts of indexicals are 'essential', in the sense that they cannot be eliminated in favor of descriptions. This paper also introduces the influential idea that certain sorts of indexicals play a special role in thought, and have a special connection to action.
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  • (1 other version)Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235–256.
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  • (1 other version)Self-locating belief and the sleeping beauty problem.Adam Elga - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
    In addition to being uncertain about what the world is like, one can also be uncertain about one’s own spatial or temporal location in the world. My aim is to pose a problem arising from the interaction between these two sorts of uncertainty, solve the problem, and draw two lessons from the solution.
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  • Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Robert Stalnaker opposes the traditional view that knowledge of one's own current thoughts and feelings is the unproblematic foundation for all knowledge. He argues that we can understand our knowledge of our thoughts and feelings only by viewing ourselves from the outside, by seeing our inner lives as features of the world as it is in itself.
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  • (1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Defeating dr. evil with self-locating belief.Adam Elga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.
    Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that (...)
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  • When betting odds and credences come apart: more worries for Dutch book arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):119-127.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems.Joseph Halpern - 2004 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 111-142.
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  • Stopping to Reflect.M. J. Schervish, T. Seidenfeld & J. B. Kadane - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):315-322.
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  • (1 other version)Deference, respect and intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle :235–256, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle :478–502, 2007; Bovens and Rabinowicz in Episteme 8:281–300, 2011; Titelbaum in Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief, OUP, Oxford, 2012; Hedden in Mind 124:449–491, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Sleeping Beauty Reconsidered: Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems.Joseph Halpern - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.
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  • (1 other version)Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism.Brian Skyrms - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 253--261.
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