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  1. Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. The companion volume, Genes and the (...)
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  • Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
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  • Computation and Consciousness.Tim Maudlin - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (8):407.
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  • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke.Peter H. Nidditch (ed.) - 1975 - Oxford University Press UK.
    A scholarly edition of Essay Concerning Human Understanding by P. H. Nidditch. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.
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  • Extended Mind and Identity.Robert A. Wilson & Bartlomiej A. Lenart - 2014 - In Levy Neil & Clausen Jens (eds.), Handbook on Neuroethics. Springer. pp. 423-439.
    Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psychological continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative memory of some kind, special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person’s psychological states can physically extend beyond that person’s (...)
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  • Extended functionalism.M. Wheeler - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
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  • (1 other version)The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity.[Electronic version] In F. Kessel, P. Cole & D. Johnson.Daniel Dennet - 1992 - In Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. Cole & Dale L. Johnson (eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
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  • (1 other version)A Beginner’s Guide to Group Minds.Georg Theiner - 2014 - In Mark Sprevak & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 301-22.
    Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds that (1) minds are exclusively possessed by individuals, and that (2) no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms, associated closely with their brains, and no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered as capable of having a mind. Let us refer to the conjunction of (1) (...)
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  • Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind.Robert D. Rupert - 2009 - New York, US: Oup Usa.
    Robert Rupert argues against the view that human cognitive processes comprise elements beyond the boundary of the organism, developing a systems-based conception in place of this extended view. He also argues for a conciliatory understanding of the relation between the computational approach to cognition and the embedded and embodied views.
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  • The Extended Self.Eric T. Olson - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):481-495.
    The extended-mind thesis says that mental states can extend beyond one’s skin. Clark and Chalmers infer from this that the subjects of such states also extend beyond their skin: the extended-self thesis. The paper asks what exactly the extended-self thesis says, whether it really does follow from the extended-mind thesis, and what it would mean if it were true. It concludes that the extended-self thesis is unattractive, and does not follow from the extended mind unless thinking beings are literally bundles (...)
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
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  • Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind.Zoe Drayson - 2010 - Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
    This paper explores the relationship between several ideas about the mind and cognition. The hypothesis of extended cognition claims that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head, that elements of the world around us can actually become parts of our cognitive systems. It has recently been suggested that the hypothesis of extended cognition is entailed by one of the foremost philosophical positions on the nature of the mind: functionalism, the thesis that mental states are defined by their functional (...)
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  • (1 other version)Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: history, the extended mind, and the civilizing process.John Sutton - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 189-225.
    On the extended mind hypothesis (EM), many of our cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and nonbiological realms. In certain circumstances, things - artifacts, media, or technologies - can have a cognitive life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the embodied brains with which they couple. The realm of the mental can spread across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains. My independent aims in this chapter are: first, to (...)
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  • Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded.Richard Menary - 2007 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. However, we cannot (...)
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  • In defence of extended functionalism.Michael Wheeler - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 245--270.
    According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts (or more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status.1 According to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way (...)
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  • Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that the human mind is not bound inside the head but extends into body and environment.
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  • Extended Cognition and Functionalism.Mark Sprevak - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):503-527.
    Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head.1 Call this the “hypothesis of extended cognition” (HEC). HEC has been strongly criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert.2 In this paper I argue for two claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have supposed. A widely-held view about the nature of the mind, functionalism—a view to which Rupert, Adams and Aizawa appear to subscribe— entails HEC. Either (...)
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  • Overextending the mind.Brie Gertler - 2007 - In Brie Gertler & Lawrence A. Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind. London: Routledge. pp. 192--206.
    Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to (...)
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  • Kinds of Minds.Daniel C. Dennett - 1996 - Basic Books.
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  • (1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • The dimensions of realization: A critique of the standard view.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):316-323.
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  • The Mind Incarnate.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2004 - MIT Press.
    Shapiro tests these hypotheses against two rivals, the mental constraint thesis and the embodied mind thesis. Collecting evidence from a variety of sources (e.g., neuroscience, evolutionary theory, and embodied cognition) he concludes that the multiple realizability thesis, accepted by most philosophers as a virtual truism, is much less obvious than commonly assumed, and that there is even stronger reason to give up the separability thesis. In contrast to views of mind that tempt us to see the mind as simply being (...)
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  • (1 other version)Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press. pp. 138-164.
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  • Mad pain and Martian pain.David Lewis - 1978 - In Ned Joel Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge: , Vol. pp. 216-222.
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  • Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
    This paper -distinguishes between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition, characterizing them as competitors (both motivated by situated, interactive cognitive processing, with the latter being the more conservative of the two interpretations of the data) -clarifies the relation between content externalism and extended cognition -introduces the problem of cognitive bloat, as part of a critical discussion of Clark and Chalmers's "past-endorsement criterion" (if the criterion is embraced, we privilege the internal, endorsing process -- which looks (...)
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  • Cognition in the Wild.Edwin Hutchins - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Hutchins examines a set of phenomena that have fallen between the established disciplines of psychology and anthropology, bringing to light a new set of relationships between culture and cognition.
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  • Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.Andy Clark - 2003 - Oxford University Press. Edited by Alberto Peruzzi.
    In Natural-Born Cyborgs, Clark argues that what makes humans so different from other species is our capacity to fully incorporate tools and supporting cultural ...
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  • The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  • (1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
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  • The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  • (1 other version)The self as a center of narrative gravity.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 4--237.
    What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has (...)
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
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  • (2 other versions)Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence.G. J. Shipley - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):326-329.
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  • An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.Peter H. Nidditch (ed.) - 1979 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This paperback edition reproduces the complete text of the Essay as prepared by professor Nidditch for The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke. The Register of Formal Variants and the Glossary are omitted and Professor Nidditch has written a new foreword.
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  • Kinds of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):883-890.
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  • Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended.Andy Clark - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 43--66.
    In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife’s killer, aided by the use of notes, annotated polaroids, and (for the most important pieces of information obtained) body tattoos. Using these resources he attempts to build up a stock of new beliefs and to thus piece together the puzzle of his wife’s death. At one (...)
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  • Animalism versus lockeanism: No contest.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):369-376.
    In ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo‐Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo‐Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo‐Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and that Noonan’s (...)
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  • Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  • Persons and the extended mind thesis.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):642-658.
    . The extended‐mind thesis is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take “extended selves” be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]D. Browne - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):385-386.
    Tools and technologies expand our capacities, including our cognitive capacities. Microscopes extend our perceptual capacities. Notebooks extend the natural limits of memory. These facts are important, for all that they are obvious. The extended cognition hypothesis wants more. Some external devices and processes are literal parts of cognitive processes themselves. When there is fast and reliable access to external data or processes, then the cognitive processes that occur uncontroversially inside the brain literally and controversially extend out into the world to (...)
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  • Distributed cognition and distributed morality: Agency, artifacts and systems.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (2):431-448.
    There are various philosophical approaches and theories describing the intimate relation people have to artifacts. In this paper, I explore the relation between two such theories, namely distributed cognition and distributed morality theory. I point out a number of similarities and differences in these views regarding the ontological status they attribute to artifacts and the larger systems they are part of. Having evaluated and compared these views, I continue by focussing on the way cognitive artifacts are used in moral practice. (...)
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  • Cognitive extension: the parity argument, functionalism, and the mark of the cognitive.Sven Walter - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):285-300.
    During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues (...)
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  • Artificial intelligence and personal identity.David Cole - 1991 - Synthese 88 (3):399-417.
    Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that (...)
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  • The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology.Jim Stone - 1997 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):495-497.
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  • Does functionalism entail extended mind?Kengo Miyazono - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3523-3541.
    In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto’s beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in (...)
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