This article focuses on the deliberations of the National Institutes of Health Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel in 1988. It explores various arguments for and against the use of fetal tissue for transplantation research, following elective abortion, and for and against the use of federal funds for such research. After examining the relevance of various positions on the moral status of the fetus and the morality of abortion, the article critically examines charges that such research, especially with federal funds, (...) would involve complicity in the moral evil of abortion, would legitimate abortion practices, and would provide incentives for abortions. Finally, it considers whether the donation model is appropriate for the transfer of human fetal tissue and whether the woman who chooses to have an abortion is the appropriate donor of the tissue. (shrink)

In the debate over fetal tissue use, an analogy is often drawn between removing organs from the body of a person who has been murdered to use for transplantation, and collecting tissue from an aborted fetus to use for the same purpose. The murder victim analogy is taken by its proponents to show that even if abortion is the moral equivalent of murder, there is still no good reason to refrain from using the fetal tissue, since as a society we (...) do not see any problem about using organs from murder victims. However, I argue that the analogy between murder victims and aborted fetuses does not hold -- the two situations are not the same in all morally relevant respects. Thus the murder victim analogy does not provide an argument in favour of fetal tissue transplant. In conclusion, I point to some of the potential pitfalls of using analogies in ethical argument. (shrink)

This paper considers some aspects of the morality of complicity, understood as participation in the wrongs of another. The central question is whether there is some way of participating in the wrongs of another other than by making a causal contribution to them. I suggest that there is not. In defending this view I encounter, and resist, the claim that it undermines the distinction between principals and accomplices. I argue that this distinction is embedded in the structure of rational agency.

I argue, contrary to standard claims, that accomplice liability need not be a causal relation. One can be an accomplice to another’s crime without causally contributing to the criminal act of the principal. This is because the acts of aid and encouragement that constitute the basis for accomplice liability typically occur in contexts of under- and over-determination, where causal analysis is confounded. While causation is relevant to justifying accomplice liability in general, only potential causation is necessary in particular cases. I (...) develop this argument through the example of the role of U.S. legal officials in abetting the acts of unlawful interrogation that have taken place since 2001. I also suggest that there may be a limited justification for ex post ratificatory accomplice liability. (shrink)

Henry Friedlander explores in chilling detail how the Nazi program of secretly exterminating the handicapped and disabled evolved into the systematic destruction of Jews and Gypsies. Tracing the rise of racist and eugenic ideologies in Germany, he describes how the so-called euthanasia of the handicapped provided a practical model for mass murder, thereby initiating the Holocaust. Based on extensive research in American, German, and Austrian archives as well as Allied and German court records, the book also analyzes the involvement of (...) the German bureaucracy and judiciary, the participation of physicians and scientists, the motives of the killers, and the nature of popular opposition. Friedlander also sheds light on the special plight of handicapped Jews, who were the first singled out for murder. (shrink)