Clinical research must be understood to be the foundation of scientific medicine of the clinical type. But the essence of scientific clinical medicine remains a matter of profound confusion, even in clinical academia, and so does the essence of clinical research. The confusion now revolves, principally, around ‘clinical epidemiology’. We address clinical research in the meaning of quintessentially ‘applied’ clinical research, which we take to be the foundation of the scientific knowledge base of clinical medicine, of gnosis (dia‐, etio‐, pro‐) (...) in it. More specifically, we address the essence, priorities, and status quo of this research – and argue that the requisite theory of this is not a matter of ‘clinical epidemiology’ but of theory of clinical research endogenous to clinical (rather than epidemiological) academia. (shrink)

Rationale, aims and objectives : Evidence-based medicine (EBM) claims to be based on 'evidence', rather than 'intuition'. However, EBM's fundamental distinction between quantitative 'evidence' and qualitative 'intuition' is not self-evident. The meaning of 'evidence' is unclear and no studies of quality exist to demonstrate the superiority of EBM in health care settings. This paper argues that, despite itself, EBM holds out only the illusion of conclusive scientific rigour for clinical decision making, and that EBM ultimately is unable to fulfil its (...) own structural criteria for 'evidence'. Methods : Our deconstructive analysis of EBM draws on the work of the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction works in the name of justice to lay bare, to expose what has been hidden from view. In plain language, we deconstruct EBM's paradigm of 'evidence', the randomized controlled trial (RCT), to demonstrate that there cannot be incontrovertible evidence for EBM as such. We argue that EBM therefore 'auto-deconstructs' its own paradigm, and that medical practitioners, policymakers and patients alike ought to be aware of this failure within EBM itself. Results : EBM's strict distinction between admissible evidence (based on RCTs) and other supposedly inadmissible evidence is not itself based on evidence, but rather, on intuition. In other words, according to EBM's own logic, there can be no 'evidentiary' basis for its distinction between admissible and inadmissible evidence. Ultimately, to uphold this fundamental distinction, EBM must seek recourse in (bio)political ideology and an epistemology akin to faith. (shrink)