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  1. Corporate governance reforms in developing countries.Darryl Reed - 2002 - Journal of Business Ethics 37 (3):223 - 247.
    Corporate governance reforms are occurring in countries around the globe. In developing countries, such reforms occur in a context that is primarily defined by previous attempts at promoting "development" and recent processes of economic globalization. This context has resulted in the adoption of reforms that move developing countries in the direction of an Anglo-American model of governance. The most basic questions that arise with respect to these governance reforms are what prospects they entail for traditional development goals and whether alternatives (...)
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  • Exploring the Relationship Between Board Characteristics and CSR: Empirical Evidence from Korea.Young Kyun Chang, Won-Yong Oh, Jee Hyun Park & Myoung Gyun Jang - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 140 (2):225-242.
    Previous studies in Western contexts have examined the relationships between various board characteristics and CSR, yet the relationships need to be re-examined in non-Western contexts given differential theoretical premises across contexts. We specifically propose that the effects of board characteristics on CSR in Korea should be patterned distinctively from Western-based existing literature, focusing on three important board characteristics, such as a board’s independence, social ties, and diversity. Using a panel dataset from large Korean firms, we found that various relationships between (...)
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  • Removing Vacant Chairs: Does Independent Directors’ Attendance at Board Meetings Matter?Huilong Liu, Hong Wang & Liansheng Wu - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 133 (2):375-393.
    In this paper we investigate whether independent directors’ attendance at board meetings enhances investor protection using a difference-in-difference approach. We find that independent directors’ attendance alleviates tunneling. This effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises than in state-owned enterprises. The reinforcement of external supervision substitutes for the role of independent directors’ attendance and this substitution effect is more significant in non-SOEs. Together, these results imply that independent directors’ attendance at board meetings can play an important role in protecting investors, especially (...)
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